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GIVEN the operational definitions of inputs and outputs, the con-
ceptual problems of measuring productivity change are much the same
in one industry as in another. The present paper is not addressed to
these generic problems, except incidentally, but is focused on the
problems of conceptual specification that arise in studying this par-
ticular industry.
Medical care involves more than the cure of ailments; indeed, con-
sidering the importance of psychosomatic factors in the genesis of
disease and of socio-economic factors in the genesis of psychological
disturbance, most household consumption could be treated as pre-
ventive medicine. But however defensible such a classification might
be, it is not consonant with either individual or social resource alloca-
tion procedures. Despite mixed motives, confusion of purpose, and a
high propensity to convert erstwhile pleasures into current medical
necessities, we still have fairly definite standards as to what we will
treat as medical care expenditure. These standards are manifested in
what is covered by publicly sponsored medical insurance programs
or privately financed medical insurance plans; by what the Bureau
of Internal Revenue will allow as a medical expense deduction for
income tax purposes, and so forth.
In essence, a service will usually be considered as medical care if
NOTE: This paper was written as part of a project on the Supply and Demand
of Medical Personnel, sponsored by the Ford Foundation.96Production and Productivity in Service Industries
it is provided by or under the direction of a licensed physician or if
its provision by anyone else would be cause for prosecution for prac-
ticing medicine without a license.1 Services recommended as benefi-
cial by a physician may or may not be considered as medical care;
e.g., ocean voyages, frequent swimming in warm water, and so forth,
may be recommended by a physician, but are not always considered
as medical care by the Internal Revenue Service and hardly ever by
the keepers of the National Accounts.
For simplicity, let us make the boundaries of the medical care in-
dustry coterminous with the coverage of medical care insurance or
publicly provided comprehensive medical care service—whichever is
wider. Clearly, in most advanced countries there is a consensus that
what is considered medical care is to be favored (subsidized) relative
to most other objects of consumer expenditure. It is necessary, there-
fore, that there be some fairly sharp distinction between what is to
qualify for subsidy and what is not. Similarly, purveyors of medical
care. insurance must sharply distinguish between those items of ex-
penditure for which they will pay and those for which they will not.
Normally, to qualify as medical care, an object of expenditure must
have either a significant element of immediate physical unpleasantness
about it or involve the requisition by a (presumably) disinterested
third party, usually a physician. Failing third party control, there is
serious risk that claims for compensation would become so frequent
as to drive insurance premia to unattractively high levels in order to
cover costs.2
An obvious locus of control over utilization of medical services is
the physician. Indeed, the physician's claim to complete control over
patient treatment makes it almost impossible to locate the control
elsewhere. On this basis, one could define medical care expenditure
1 The aftermath of an illness may involve a prolonged period of care (e.g., in a
nursing home), which may be physician-prescribed but not physician-controlled.
During such periods, distinguishing between ordinary consumption and medical
care involves many arbitrary decisions.
2 Of course, insurance can be made fair" at any level of claims, if
the level of premia is appropriately adjusted. However, insurance is usually attrac-
tive (to those insured) only when infrequent claims permit low premia relative to
the average size of claim. "Overuse," therefore, threatens the viability of insurance
systems leading to tightened controls as well as high premia. Similarly, overuse of
publicly provided or subsidized services leads to their curtailment, adulteration,
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as that which is ordered by a physician for the benefit of a patient.
This view of medical care implies a very sharp distinction between the
well individual and the sick (ideally, hospitalized) one; none of the
former's expenditure is controlled by the physician (and therefore
none goes for medical care) while all of the current consumption of
the hospitalized individual is medical care. Obviously much thinking
about the economics of medical care, past and present, reflects this
dichotomy.
But an increasingly important body of medical thought recognizes
the impact of general consumption patterns(e.g., housing) upon
health. Many physicians, consciously or otherwise, have begun to ad-
just treatment patterns to facilitate substitution of costless (to the
patient) health-enhancing inputs for ordinary consumption. For ex-
ample, physicians will sometimes hospitalize patients primarily be-
cause the home environment is deleterious (e.g., the patient will walk
too many stairs; be exposed to an emotionally disturbing situation or
to a bad diet) rather than because he "needs" hospital services. The
extent to which this is done appears to vary with the availability of
hospital beds,3 which means, among other things, that increases in
hospital productivity leading to a shorter hospital stay for a given
medical condition may be obscured by an offsetting increase in the
consumption of the hotel services rendered by hospitals. That is, in-
creases in productivity in hospitals may go unrecorded because of an
expansion of the range of services recorded as medical care. As will
be seen, this possibility creates measurement difficulties in several
contexts.
Nevertheless, considerations of public policy require that we main-
tain the distinction between medical care and other consumer ex-
penditures;and the policy considerations that impel maintenance
of this distinction, suggest where it be drawn. Medical care expendi-
3 There is a substantial body of evidence supporting this statement. Numerous
citations have been made in a previous paper, "Some Problems in the Economics
of Hospital Care," American Economic Review, May 1965, pp. 472—480, footnotes
5—15. M. S. Feldstein, Economic Analysis for Health Service Efficiency: Econometric
Studies of the British National Health Service, Amsterdam, 1967, pp. 193—222 and
"An Aggregative Model of the Health Care Sector" (mimeographed), Oxford Univer.
sity, 1967, presents evidence, for both the U.K. and the U.S., that utilization of
hospital beds is increased by an increase in supply.
4 Because it is public policy to subsidize the former, but not the latter.98Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
ture is that for which medical care insurance will pay (or at least
make a contribution). Obviously, medical care insurance policies vary
in coverage; for the purpose of this definition, consider the broadest
type of coverage that is generally
This definition of medical care expenditure suggests correlative
measures of price change and productivity. If medical care is that
which can be purchased by means of medical care insurance, then its
"price" varies proportionately with the price of such insurance.° That
is, for a person of given age and health, the mathematical expectation
of expenditure on medical care will vary proportionately with the
premium of a comprehensive medical care insurance Changes
in resource productivity of medical care may then be measured as the
reciprocal of the change in the ratio of an index of medical care in-
surance premia to an index of prices of inputs used in producing
medical care.8
5Forthe purpose of this definition, the fraction of the cost borne by the in-
surer is irrelevant.
6HaroldWatts has asked "if medical care is that which can be purchased by
means of medical care insurance, isn't life that which can be purchased with life
insurance?" Humor aside, the question raises an important issue;isinsurance
offered in real or in money. (nominal) terms? Life insurance, like most other kinds,
is really a promise to pay money as compensation for the occurrence of an un-
desired event. Medical care insurance may take the form of cash payments that
serve as an offset to payments made for medical care or it may involve direct pro-
vision of care (as in a prepayment plan).
Direct provision of care under complete prepayment is real (medical care) insur-
ance; payment of the insured's medical bills where the amount of insurance benefit
is an increasing function of the size of the bill is also real insurance, with co-
insurance aspects. Where the amount of the insurance benefit is fixed in money
terms (independent of the dollar magnitude of the medical bills), insurance is
nominal. Obviously, a given policy may be a combination of real and nominal
(money) insurance. Insurance premia are assumed to be paid in money terms,
though real premia are imaginable.
Where medical care insurance is real, the insurer must be concerned with prices
of the goods and services he must either provide or pay for. As the quality or the
amenities of care are likely to vary with its price, the insurer is also involved in
matters regarding the kind of care to be provided. This brings the third party
(the insurer) into the market for medical care as a party interested in minimiza-
don of his own liability. This possibility obviously cannot arise in the case of
nominal insurance such as is afforded by life insurance.
7Thisstatement assumes that the insuring industry is in lông-run competitive
equilibrium at all relevant moments and that the insurance covers all expendi-
ture for medical care (i.e., the insurance is comprehensive and has no coinsurance
features).
8Productivitychange is measured here as the ratio of the relative change in
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To define a price index of medical care in terms of the cost of medi-
cal care insurance differs from the procedure used in constructing the
medical care component (M) of the Consumer Price Index; this com-
ponent is essentially an index of input prices.9 The medical care com-
ponent can take no account of the effect of changed efficiency on the
cost of medical care nor can it take account of changes in the "quality"
of care. The "cost of insurance" index does reflect changes in the
efficiency of producing medical care of given quality. Its major short-
coming, shared with M or any conceivable index, is that of distin-
guishing between price changes due to changing costs of producing
an output unit of given quality, and those attributable to changes in
the quality of the unit.
In order to have a meaningful measure of productivity change, it
is essential to define a unit of output so that it can be measured inde-
pendently of changes in the input units. To measure medical care in
hours of physician time, hospital bed-days used, etc., or some com-
posite thereof, precludes the possibility of detecting changes in the
efficiency (greater or less output per unit of input) with which the
care is produced. One way to circumvent this difficulty is to define
medical care ostensively; i.e., medical care is that which is provided
for an individual who has membership in (say) a particular compre-
hensive prepaid medical care plan.b0 In a comprehensive care plan,
quantity of care is all that is "medically" needed as determined by the
attending physician. (The complicated physician-patient interaction
that actually determines quantity of care under any administrative
system may be ignored for the moment; it is discussed in the next
section.) Quality of care is designated as that which is delivered under
of the inputs used in its production. This implies neglect of changes in the ratio
of average cost to price in the insuring industry.
9Mis a weighted average of prices of services of doctors, nurses, drugs, appli-
ances, hospital room rates, and other goods and services (inputs) used in producing
medical care. The construction of the medical care component of the CPI is de-
scribed in detail by E. A. Langford, "Medical Care in the Consumer Price Index,
1936—56," Monthly Labor Review, September 1957, pp.1058—1058; and E. D.
Hoover, "The CPI and the Problems of Quality Change," Monthly Labor Review,
November 1961, pp.1175—1185.
10Iam here defining output of medical care as that available to a subscriber of
a medical care plan, not what is used. This slurs over the important problem of
the unpaid inputs in medical care, such as the time of the patient and his family,
which will be discussed later. For the moment assume an individual's use of medi-
cal care is determined by his physician.100Production and Productivity in Service Industries
the plan, and changes in quality are measured by various perform-
ance measures as discussed below.
Changes in the quantity of care supplied are measured as follows:
for each member of a given "treatment-need" class, defined by age,
sex, and other relevant variables, the average inputs used in a base
period are computed. Each person in the plan is weighted by the
value of "inputs used per individual" in his treatment-need class, and
the weighted sum computed.11 The weighted number of individuals
enrolled in the plan is the measure of output at specified quality, and
changes in deflated value of input per unit of output (so defined)
measure variations in productivity.
The critical assumption in this hypothetical procedure is that qual-
ity of care is unchanged. How can quality of care be measured? One
method is as follows:it will be generally agreed that among the
objectives of medical care are(I) lower age-sex specific mortality
rates; (2) lower rates of undetected illness; (3) lower rates of improper
treatment of specific ailments. It is, at least in principle, possible to
compare different groups of subscribers (standardized for age and sex)
with different medical care plans—or the same plan in different time
periods—in respect of each of these three characteristics, and to rank
the quality of health care received in terms of the results.
There are serious, but not insuperable difficulties to carrying out
such a program in practice. Comparisons of mortality rates present
no special problem. Comparison of different rates of undiagnosed ail-
ments requires "medical audits" of sample groups of patients by a
team of "experts"; such audits have been made, but notoriously there
is resistance to such procedures.12 Deciding upon the appropriateness
11 The appropriate weighting or standardization techniques are well-known, and
present no greater difficulties here than in most other uses.
12 Among such "audits" that have been made are 0. L. Peterson, et al., "An
Analytical Study of North Carolina General Practice, 1953—54," Journal of Medical
Education, December 1956, Part 2; K. F. Clute, The General Practitioner, Toronto,
1963; and C. C. Jungfer and J. M. Last, "Clinical Performance in Australian
General Practice," Medical Care, April—June 1964, pp. 71—83. Critical analyses of
hospital admissions, dismissals, and treatment may be found in "Research in
Hospital Use: Progress and Problems," Conference Report, U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service (Public Health Service Pub-
licat ion No.930-E.1), Washington,D.C., 1962. An excellent review of the literature
on the evaluation of quality of medical care is Avedis Donabedian, "Evaluating
the Quality of Medical Care," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, July 1966, pp.
166—206; this source contains an extensive bibliography.Productivity in the Medical Care Industry 101
ofcourses of treatment requires examination of patient records and
(on a sample basis) systematic scrutiny of treatment of individual pa-
tients from initial complaint (or detection of illness on a checkup)
until completion. Here again, some pioneering work has been done,'3
but medical auditing is in its infancy.
Other important aspects of quality of health care can be readily
monitored; patient satisfaction would surely be one. I claim no more
than relevance for the aspects mentioned. It is probable that many of
the interesting aspects will reflect a certain penumbra of professional
disagreement as to which therapeutic techniques are superior. In the
absence of strong consensus as to quality ranking of treatment methods
or diagnostic procedures, there is little point to comparing the quality
of treatment afforded different groups of persons. However, on a large
number of important matters there is strong agreement as to what is
an acceptable procedure and what is not.'4
For purposes of productivity measurement, a dichotomy between
acceptable and unacceptable procedures may be all that is needed.
What we are trying to do is to compare ratios of outputs to inputs for
different groups of individuals, and to take account of possible varia-
tions in quality that may be associated with differences in these ratios.
The more sensitive the quality scales, the better; but for the econo-
mist the sensitivity of these scales is a datum. In the absence of un-
ambiguous evidence of countervailing quality change, it is generally
agreed that changes in methods of production that increase productiv-
ity are good—and vice-versa. But variations in quality of output, when
they can be detected, serve as notice that increases in measured pro-
ductivity may not have resulted from improved productive technique
alone, and that a problem of relative valuation of quality change
vis-a-vis pecuniary cost has
To describe changes in productivity that accompany changes in
quality of medical care I would recommend, as a first step, that the
13Forexample, Clute, op. cit., Chapters 2, 16, and 17.
14Foran illustration of this point see Peterson et at., cit., pp. 18—48, and
Clute, cit., Chapters 16 and 17.
15Inan interesting paper, and the Price of Medical Services," soon
to be published in the Journal of Political Economy, Dr. Yoram Barzel attempts to
measure changes in the cost of medical care by changes in premia for health insur-
ance. His paper is in much the same spirit as the first section of this one, though
the details are quite different.102Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
productivity index and each dimension of quality of care be presented
as distinct elements of a medical care vector. Consider the following
hypothetical example: suppose that between years 0 and 1produc-
tivity increased by 10 per cent; life expectancy at age 1 increased by
six months; the number of cases (per 1,000 persons standardized) of
undetected illness of specified kinds decreased by 3 per cent, but the
percentage of improper treatments increased from 79 per cent of
all cases. To reduce this vector to a scalar requires the postulation of
a set of marginal rates of substitution (trade-offs) between the various
elements; e.g., at a given rate of (1) annual change of productivity in
medical care; (2) percentage of undetected illness;(3) percentage of
improper treatments; (4) per capita income, and so forth, an addi-
tional 1 per cent increase in productivity per annum must be judged to
be as desirable as, say, an additional 1/4percent annual decline in un-
detected illness per 1,000 persons, or an additional 1/3percent annual
decline in improper treatments.
Establishing these trade-offs is essential to any useful measurement
of productivity in medical care. This is because it is so easy to increase
(measured) productivity by adulterating product or (see below) appro-
priating unmeasured inputs.16 And it is not impossible for individual
investigators to establish some such set of trade-offs. But the process
will involve difficult judgments of value (e.g., how much money it is
worth to increase life expectancy bymonths). Price data may be
relevant to these judgments, but which prices should be used and how
is likely to be a matter of substantial disagreement. Under the circum-
stances, measurers of productivity change may do well to present all
the elements of the aforementioned vector and let each student com-
bine them as he wishes.
•The above procedure is oriented toward measuring the output of
medical care used by members of comprehensive prepaid plans. But
1CThispossibility is not peculiar to the medical care industry, but arises wher-
ever quality change is feasible. For an indication of the importance of "quality"
change in automobile manufacturing, see F. K. Fisher, Z. Griliches, and C. Kaysen,
"The Costs of Automobile Model Changes Since 1949," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, October 1962, pp. 433—451. J. L. Nicholson, "The Measurement of Quality
Changes," Economic Journal, September 1967, pp. 512—530, offers a broad discus-
sion of this subject and his footnotes contain numerous references to the relevant
literature.Productivity in the Medical Care Industry 103
oniya small part of the American population now is, or in the near
future will be, enrolled in such plans. How then are we to measure
output quantity for persons buying some or all of their medical care
on a fee-for-service basis? The best, though very Imperfect, answer
that occurs to me is as follows: make elaborate periodic surveys of
physician use by individuals (such as a national health survey) and
treat base-year expenditures asthe measure of base-year output.
Follow up patient interviews with physician interviews to obtain rea-
son or diagnosis for each contact. Typical cost of each specific illness
can be computed as A. A. Scitovsky does (see below). Then• relative
output level in a given year may be measured as the relative number
of illnesses treated, each illness weighted by an appropriate composite
of its base- and given-year costs. Productivity change can be measured,
as before, by dividing the index of relative outputs by an index of
relative inputs. The input index can be computed from the data on
the costs of specific illnesses. Quality changes can be measured by
sample checkups on the physical condition of persons studied in the
surveys of physician use.
At this point, economists may well protest at getting involved in
the complicated problems of measuring quality of medical care and
evaluating the social importance of its various aspects. Why not treat
health care like other commodities and evaluate quality by price?
If a "unit" of one type of care sells for twice as much as another at
the same time and place, its production involves the use of twice the
value of resources;newtypes of care can be valued relative to old
types via chain indexes as well (or badly) as new varieties of other
products, and so forth.
I would not deny the possibility of treating medical care as "just
another commodity" for purposes of measuring price and productivity
changes. Howevef, there are two peculiarities of the medical care
product that are likely to make such treatment less than normally
satisfactory. One is the prevalence of price discrimination that ob-
scures the meaning both of "market price" and output Ufljt.18 A more
17Theimplicit assumption of competitive equilibrium in this statement may be
challenged.
18 Price discrimination in medical care is not as simple a matter as itis often
thought to be. Granted that physicians may charge wealthy patients higher fees, it
is not so obvious that they do not also give them more time, appointments on104Production and Productivity in Service Industries
fundamental difficulty is that for many purposes of social policy what
is meant by quality of medical care is a technical medical judgment
of efficacy in promoting "health," and not an inference from observed
consumption patterns.
A useful though more limited measure of productivity variation
may be inferred from Mrs. Scitovsky's study of the cost of specific ill-
nesses.'9 By taking a number of specifically diagnosed illnesses, and
following the recorded methods of treatment, she, has been able to
measure the specific inputs used in treating each illness at any given
time, and to measure changes in inputs occurring over time.2° Where
effectiveness of treatment can be treated as unchanged, one may meas-
ure changes in productivity as the reciprocal of the (deflated) value of
inputs per case. However, in some illnesses, technological progress has
the. effect of keeping people alive longer, but under continuing treat-
ment. In other illnesses, new techniques promote more frequent re-
coveries, but also use more resources per case. In both of these types
of illness, measurement of productivity requires allowance for quality
change.
If we confine ourselves to cases where quality of treatment can be
regarded as substantially unchanged over time (for the last decade,
normal pregnancies, and tonsillectomies might be examples), we can
get an estimate of productivity change in medical care for quality-
constant output. Such an estimate would be highly useful in deter-
mining whether, say, the organizational structure of the industry was
making it less technologically progressive than others and, if so, which
inputs were responsible.2' One could also estimate the effect (on pro-
shorter notice, and other benefits. Also, physicians tend togive more time to
"interesting patients" than to others without charging higher fees. The consequence
of this is to make record keeping and data collection more than ordinarily difficult.
'9A.A. Scitovsky, "Changes in the Costs of Treatment of Selected Illnesses, 1951—
65," American Economic Review, December 1967, pp. 1182—1195.
20Actuallywhat Mrs. Scitovsky has done is to measure changes in the money
cost of treating specific illnesses. However, her procedure is such asto permit
measurement of the inputs used at different times (at least to the extent of con-
structing an index), so, that her data could be readily used for measurements of
productivity.
21Itis hazardous to infer a measure of quality-constant productivity change for
all illnesses from its measure in those illnesses where change in quality of treat-
ment has been negligible. Any such inference must either assume that increases in
productive efficiency are the same in treatment of illnesses where quality of care
is improving as in other illnesses, or make allowance for the differences.Productivity in the Medical Care Industry 105
ductivity)of changes in the mix of illnesses treated. Such measures
could help answer many of the questions to which analysis of produc-
tivity change normally is applied. However, they would not enable us
to measure those productivity changes that result in better health (i.e.,
more efficacious treatment) but not in greater economy of resources
used per episode of illness.
Yet another approach to measuring output and productivity change
is that of studying working days lost.22 Clearly an important part of
the economic loss from illnessisthe foregone output of disabled
workers. A reduction in hours lost on account of illness (per labor
force member, standardized for age and sex) indicates an improved
quality of medical care. Evaluating the saved hours at their presump-
tive market value provides a quantitative measure of the quality im-
provement over the relevant period of time. However, this measure
also has its shortcomings: (1) it is necessary to assume that the incen-
tives and attitudes governing the allocation of time between work,
leisure, and illness remain unchanged, or to allow for the effect of
their variation; (2) it is also necessary to allow for the possible effect
of earlier return to work (after an illness) on productive efficiency
and (3) the measure takes no account of increased consumer satisfac-
tions from better quality care; i.e., the value of keeping more people
alive—or healthier—than before, though not at work.
Finally, let me note that there has been a considerable number of
studies using a "straightforward" measurement of productivity change,
with output defined as (deflated) value of sales, and little or no at-
tempt to correct for quality variation.23. These and other studies con-
22Thishas been done for U.S. Navy personnel in an interesting unpublished
dissertation by M. E. Horton, at the University of Washington, 1966. B. A. Weis.
brod, Economics of Public Health, Philadelphia, 1961, contains a serious effort to
measure the pecuniary losses due to major diseases. Calculations of the type per-
formed by Weisbrod can play an important role in measuring output of the
medical care sector; i.e., reduced pecuniary losses from disease is one indicator of
improved quality of medical care. H. E. Kiarman, The Economics of Health Care,
New York, 1965, p. 164, has suggested that the value of'health as a consumer' good
may be inferred from the expenditure on nondisabling diseases of those not in the
labor force.
28Twogood recent discussions of productivity changes in medical care are
Kiarman, ibid., pp. 149—157; and Rashi Fein, The Doctor Shortage, Washington,
D.C., 1967, Chapter IV. Fein makes numerous references to more detailed studies,
in particular to an unpublished dissertation by Jeffery Weiss, "The Changing Job106Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
tammany points that merit discussion; some of them will be dis-
cussed below, but many others will not. The reason for bypassing
them is to concentrate upon what is, at least to me, a more funda-
mental question: the relation of "industrial organization" to man-
power productivity in medical care.
In this first section, I have attempted to make some suggestions for
procedure in the measurement of productivity change in medical care.
In so doing, I have assumed that quality of medical care could be
defined in technical terms so that it would be meaningful for a public
health expert to say, for example, that the care provided subscribers
to the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York was as good as
that provided the average New Yorker under fee for service. This
assumption is pragmatically useful for many purposes of public policy.
But there is another aspect of medical care, the psychiatric-priestly
(Rasputin?) aspect, that is not likely to be reflected in epidemiological
data, no matter how good they are. This aspect has important effects
on the economics of medical care and on productivity changes in
particular; hence it is considered extensively in the remainder of the
paper.
METHODS OF PAYMENT, INCENTIVES AND THE
QUALITY-QUANTITY OF MEDICAL CARE
My colleague, Professor K. J. Arrow, has contended that medical care
has many aspects that differentiate it from other commodities, and
that these significantly affect the type of organizational framework
most likely to approach Pareto optimality.24 No doubt this is so, but
to stress similarities or differences among commodities is mainly a
matter of expository convenience. For the moment, it is the similarities
between medical care and certain other commodities which are most
important; later some differences will be discussed.
Structure of Health Manpower," Harvard University, 1966. M. S. Feldstein, op. cit.,
presents an excellent cross-sectional analysis of cost and productivity differentials
in British hospitals; and Alex Maurizi, "The Economics of the Dental Profession,"
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1967, has made an important
first step in explaining productivity differentials among dentists.
24K.J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Economics of Medical Care," American
Economic Review, December 1965, pp. 941—973.Productivity in the Medical Care Industry 107
Methodsof Payment
In principle all services rendered by humans (as distinguished from
animals or inanimate capital) may be purchased under one of two
types of contract: an employment contract or a sales contract.25 Under
an employment contract, the purchaser hires the services of an indi-
vidual and assumes the responsibility for directing him so as to obtain
the desired results.26 Under a sales contract, the purchaser hires the
supplier and allows the latter to do the job in the manner he con-
siders appropriate.
For services whosesatisfactoryperformance requirestechnical
knowledge, it is impossible for the relatively ignorant buyer to super-
vise the seller. Such services include not only medicine, but also law,
house construction, automobile repair and many others; sometimes
even economic consulting. Clearly, in any of these cases a sales con-
tract is in order. But what method of payment should be used? The
supplier's incentive to perform will differ with the method of payment.
Consider the case of house construction: if the supplier (contractor)
is paid a fixed fee, his incentive is to skimp on services rendered. If
he is paid on a per hour basis, he has an incentive to reduce "effort"
per hour. If he is paid strictly on the basis of "output," quality must
be controlled lest he attempt to increase earnings by substituting
quantity for quality. Any combination of the above involves weaken-
ing the incentive to err (from the buyer's viewpoint) in any one direc-
tion, but induces "errors" in some combination of all other directions.
Assume the person for whom the house is being built (the buyer)
is attempting to maximize his expected utility and that, other things
being equal, this depends upon the quality of the house, the date at
wKich it is completed and the amount it costs him. Suppose the buyer
is extremely averse to any reduction in the stock of his liquid asset
holdings below some minimum level, and that as a result he seeks a
contractor who agrees to construct the house (in accordance with
specified plans) for a fixed price. This would seem to imply that the
25H.A. Simon, 'A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship," Econo-
metrica, July 1951, pp.293—305.
26is assumed, implicitly, that the wage rate is high enough to make the em-
ployee anxious to avoid being discharged and therefore willing to accept direction.108Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
risks of fluctuating input prices, random fluctuations in factor produc-
tivity, factor availabilities, etc., are borne by the contractor.
However, the contractor is also a utility maximizer; his maximiza-
tion is subject to the constraints that the house be of minimum quality
and be completed not later than some date. These constraints reflect,
in uncertain proportions, the contractor's concern for his reputation,
his fear of law suits or possible loss of license, and his ethics. Also
assume, realistically, that both improving the quality of the house and
advancing its date of completion have a positive and decreasing mar-
ginal utility to the contractor, but also have a positive and increasing
marginal cost. Under these circumstances, an unanticipated rise in
factor prices will lead to some decline in house-quality, and vice-versa.
Thus the risk of fluctuations in factor prices will be shared between
the buyer and the contractor. How they are shared will depend cru-
cially upon the elasticity of the contractor's marginal utility with re-
spect to superior quality and prompter completion; the greater this
elasticity, the smaller the loss to the buyer (in quality and speed of
completion) from a given shift in the marginal cost of improving
either one.27 However, whatever change occurs in the final product,
it will not—because of the fixed fee provision of the contract—affect
the amount of money paid. Therefore, given that the contractor has
some freedom to respond to unanticipated cost changes, he will do so
in the quality or completion-date directions.
What is crucial in this argument is the implicit assumption that
the contract does not completely determine what it is that the buyer
is to obtain. In principle we might assume that it is possible to draw
up building plans in sufficient detail and to specify a completion date,
so that the contractor has no freedom of maneuver in respect of what
he delivers.28 But then what happens when in some respect he violates
such a contract as, in an uncertain universe, he always will? Literal
satisfaction of such a contract, including completion date, cannot be
27 It also depends upon the buyer's bargaining skill;i.e., once a fixed fee con-
tractis signed, important elements of a bilateral monopoly situation (between
buyer and contractor). arise.
28 Whether itis. linguistically possible to specify quality completely is a deep
question we may profitably avoid. Itis sufficient to assume such specification too
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required.However, forfeits and penalties may be assessed; the default-
ing contractor may be compelled to relinquish his life, fortune, repu-
tation or parts thereof. But in order to induce him voluntarily to
agree to such rigid contract terms, the price offered for fulfilling the
contract would have to be so high that (in residential construction)
contracts are normally left quite "loose," especially as regard comple-
tion date.29
In oth.er words, the cost of shifting all risks of inferior quality and
delayed completion to the contractor would be so great that normally
such risks are shared. Sharing implies leaving a penumbra of vagueness
about quality and completion date, and relying upon the contractor's
concern for his reputation and, in extreme cases, fear of law Suits, to
insure reasonable performance. But effectively to judge the quality of
contractor performance requires more knowledge and time than many
buyers possess. To compensate for this incapacity, they hire an archi-
tect to supervise the construction. This normally implies closer super-
vision of quality than the buyer can provide, shifting some of the
risk of quality variation from buyer to contractor; consequently
a contractor's price for completing a given set of plans normally is
higher if there is to be architect supervision than otherwise.
'Where uncertainty of input prices, worker productivity 30 or avail-
ability of inputs is appreciable, the contractor may wish to minimize
his own pecuniary risk and seek payment on a cost plus basis.
Whether the buyer will accept such a contract obviously depends
upon the price of alternative arrangements (e.g., a fixed fee or target
price arrangement); his appraisal of the moral hazard in letting such
a contract and his ability to supervise or oversee the work.3' When a
contractor (or worker) is paid on an hourly basis, he will usually
29 An additional reason for permitting contracts to be loose, relevant to residen-
tial construction though not to medical care, is that the buyer often wants freedom
to change specifications.
30 Which varies with working conditions, the difficulty of the job, etc.
81 The issue of deciding upon the form of contract also arises in the procurement
of weapons. Most of the questions discussed in this section in relation to the pur-
chase of medical care (e.g., evaluation and control of quality; speed of delivery;
incentive to perform well; conflict of interest between buyer and producer) have
analogues in weapons acquisition. For a detailed discussion of these problems in
the context of the weapons industry see M. J. Peck and F. M. Scherer, "The Weap-
ons Acquisition Process," Cambridge, Mass., 1962, especially Part III.110Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
maximize his own satisfaction by working at a slower pace than that
which would minimize cost per job at given quality. If his rate of
pay is above the market, or he fears a shortage of demand at the
going rate, pecuniary are added to nonpecuniary incentives to work
slowly. Conversely, if he has mistakenly accepted a rate below the
market and demand has unexpectedly increased, he has an incentive
to speed completion at the expense of quality.
It is not usually feasible to vary payment to the contractor with
quality of performance. But among lawyers, fees contingent on awards
are very common in damage suits, and paying commissions as a per-
centage of sales is standard practice in a wide variety of selling situa-
tions. While the idea of relating the size of the doctor's fee to the
success of the treatment is not unthinkable,32 it is surely uncommon
and not likely to gain favor in the near future.
But to say this is far from conceding th.at quality of treatment is
independent of the method of payment, or that improved methods
of payment might not help improve both quality and quantity of treat-
ment. Contrary to the spirit of some recent discussion, the relation of
pecuniary incentives to quality of care is not settled by noting the
physician's dedication to his calling.38
Granted that the great majority of physicians are devoted to the
welfare of their patients, granted even further that where the voice
of ethics grows faint it is powerfully reinforced by fear of malpractice
suits; these considerations do not distinguish physicians from lawyers,
certified public accountants, architects and others whose integrity and
presumed disinterest serve as the basis for investing large sums of
money. Yet few clients of these other professionals wduld agree that
pecuniary incentive was irrelevant to the quality of their performance.
Let us consider a few of the situations in which method of payment
may plausibly be supposed to affect quality of medical care: (1) Fee
splitting. Over the years there has been a steady murmur of complaint,
within and without the medical profession, about unnecessary sur-
32 As in the possibly apocryphal story of the Chinese who allegedly paid their
physicians only when they were well.
83 Arrow, op. cit., especially pp. 949—951 and 965—966. Arrow expresses indebted-
ness (p. 949, n. 15) to the work of Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe,
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geryand its relation to the need of surgeons for more business.34
In at least one famous example, hospital utilization rates for patients
in a comprehensive prepayment plan were well below those for a
comparable group in the same community covered by a fee-for-service
plan; 85 the major source of difference between the two groups was
three diagnoses (tonsillectomy, appendectomy and hemorrhoids) where
there is a high percentage of cases in which surgery is optional. The
widespread nature of fee-splitting between the surgeon and the refer-
ring physician is indicated by the squabble between the American
College of Surgeons on the one side, and the American Medical Asso-
ciation and the American Academy of General Practice on the other,
as to whether surgeons might be permitted to hire the referring physi-
cian as an assistant and pay him a fee.36 It is often alleged that fee-
example, Eli Ginzberg, "Physician Shortage Reconsidered," The New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine, July 14, 1966, P. 86, writes:
Here are some of the statements made in passing at the recent conference
that went more or less unchallenged:
Many general surgeons are not very busy and therefore a great amount of
unnecessary surgery is performed. The situation is particularly shocking when
hysterectomies are considered. We were told that many women undergo mas-
tectomies when a less radical procedure would do. Many thyroidectomies are
performed when psychotherapy would be preferred.
There is substantial overdoctoring for a host of diseases, including in par-
ticular infections of the upper respiratory tract.
C. B. Esseistyn, M.D., "Principles of Physician Remuneration," in National Con-
ference on Labor Health Service, Proceedings, 1958, p. 126, says:
As the very carefully documented experience of the UMWA Welfare and
Retirement Fund has so adequately proven, the medical profession today does
not have sufficient maturity to resist the temptation of unnecessary procedures
so inherent in feefor.service. Furthermore, the greatest rewards under this
method of payment go not necessarily to the person who is practicing the best
quality, but rather the greatest quantity of medical care. And, as long as medi-
cine is practiced on a fee-for-service basis, preventive medicine will never be
the driving force of any doctor or group of doctors, and public health services
will always be resisted for fear of encroachment.
35 P. M. Densen, E. Balamuth and S. Shapiro, Pre paid Medical Care and Hospital
Utilization, Hospital Monograph Series No. 3, American Hospital Association, Chi-
cago, 1958; especially pp. 28—34.
86 The statements and counterstatements may be found in The New York Times
of October 5, p. 39; October 9, p. 34; October 17, p. 30; October 18, p. 42 and
November 30, p. 27 (all dates refer to 1961). The battle involved a whole set of
interrelated issues concerning the qualification of nonspecialists to perform surgical
procedures, how much surgery is unnecessary, and what constitutes "fee-splitting,"
a name abhorred by all concerned. For a good summary of the controversy, see
Lawrence Galton, "The Doctors Debate Fee-Splitting," The New York Times Maga.
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splitting is part of a make-work pattern involving referrals for un-
needed surgery.37
(2) A pervasive effect on the allocation of physician time may be
exerted by the fee for service (vis-a-vis prepayment) method of com-
pensation. Under fee for service no reward is given for time spent in
continuing study in order to keep up with new developments. Conse-
quently, one would expect that physicians practicing under fee for
service would spend a smaller fraction of their time in studying, and
a larger fraction in income earning patient care. There is reason to
believe that general practitioners spend less time in reading and up-
dating their education than they would "like," or than expert opinion
thinks they should.38 Many of the prominent medical groups (who
pay physicians a salary plus a share in profits) insist that their mem-
bers allocate a definite amount of time, as a minimum, to continuing
medical education. This evidence is supportive of the suggested hy-
pothesis, but obviously it is not conclusive.
(3) A further implication concerning the effect of method of com-
pensation on the allocation of physician time relates to the time spent
on particular procedures, or the willingness to undertake procedures
which are relatively undercompensated. Price theory suggests that
substitution of payment by fixed feefor fee for service (where the
service unit is roughly proportional totimespent) will tend to dis-
courage use of time-intensive procedures. And there is evidence that
this has happened; Clute reports a number of complaints of Canadian
physicians that some insurance companies refuse to pay adequate
compensation for patient As a result, "These men pointed
37 In addition to Ginzberg's statement (n. 35), see V. G. Damon and Isabella Taves,
"Fee Splitting, Knife Happy Surgeons and Unnecessary Doctors," Look Magazine,
June 19, 1962, Pp. 86 Ctseq.
38 For example, see Clute, op. cit., pp. 463—479, or Peterson et al., op. cit., pp.
90—91.
39 By fixed fee, I mean any method of compensation independent of the time
the physician spends or the amount or quality of service he renders. Obviously,
many schemes will meet this criterion; payment by salary or by a capitation system
(as in the British National Health Service) are two examples of what I loosely
term "fixed fee" methods of payment. M. I. Roemer, "On Paying the Doctor and
the Implications of Different Methods," Journal of Health and Human Behavior.,
Spring 1962, pp. 4—14, distinguishes three methods of payment: fee for service, capi-
tation and salary. In effect I put both of the latter under fixed fee. James Hogarth,
The Payment of the Physician, New York, 1963, gives a detailed description of
methods used to pay physicians in various European countries.
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Outthat if a doctor knew from previous experience that he would not
be paid for the extra time that he took to investigate a case thor-
oughly, he would tend, through sheer economic necessity, to do the
less time-consuming and less thorough work for which he was being
paid.'." The implications of this, as far as quality of practice is con-
cerned, are serious.41 In Britain, the difference in treatment of private
patients and of patients under the National Health Service is well-
known and is what economic considerations would lea& one to ex-
pect.42
I am not suggesting that the preceding scraps of evidence serve as
the basis for any firm conclusions regarding the comparative effects
of alternative systems of remuneration upon the pattern of medical
practice. They are intended merely to indicate that there is some em-
pirical evidence to support the implication of price theory that the
physician's allocation of his time among alternative uses will respond
in a conventional manner to variations in their relative rates of com-
pensation per hour spent.43
The Market Mechanism and Quality of Care: A Digression
Like the general public most, though not all, economists would
agree that the market mechanism cannot be trusted to provide suit-
able quantity and quality of medical care. The obvious reasons are
(1) consumer ignorance of quality, fostered by professional "ethics"
against advertising and public criticism of other doctors, and (2) re-
strictive practices that impede entry. Presumably, the restrictive prac-
tices could be eliminated, but relative consumer ignorance cannot help
but increase with growth in the stock of knowledge. These reasons are
relevant and may be adequate as a rationale for this belief.
However, there is another factor that enters into the prevailing
41Ibid.,p. 470.
42PaulFerris, The Doctors, London, 1967, pp. 33—52 and 159—163.
43Roemer,op. cit., gives emphatic support to the view taken here of the incentive
effects of the fee for service method of payment.
An interesting example of the consequences of a lack of pecuniary incentive to
perform well (combined with inadequate supervision) is described in a careful case
study of the behavior of hospital nurses when the number per shift was increased
in the hope of improving specific aspects of quality of patient care. (M. K. Aydelotte
and M. E. Tener, An Investigation of the Relation Between Nursing Activity and
Patient Welfare, Iowa City, 1960, especially Chapter IX.)Theprincipal effect of
the increased staffing was found to be mainly in increased leisure on the job for
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attitude on this question which is frequently overlooked. This is the
difference in attitude commonly taken toward the quality of medical
care we all should get—the best—and that which we are willing effec-
tively to demand as individuals. The cost of obtaining superior
medical care is not primarily—or perhaps not at all—a matter of pe-
cuniary expense, but the time, trouble and great difficulty of identi-
fying it. Moreover, high quality care is likely to be relatively time
consuming, for patients as well as doctors;careful examinations also
create patient anxieties. As a result, many people who should be able
to judge physician quality may use inferior but "convenient" physi-
cians, others don't use physician services often enough. Many people
of my acquaintance are quite casual about the selection of doctors
until they, or someone in their family, become "really sick" whereupon
they take stock and not infrequently change physicians.
Such behavior may reflect adversely on the judgment of the indi-
viduals involved. But this is not beyond dispute; granted the impor-
tance of early diagnosis and treatment of certain diseases, the increase
in the expected speed of discovery as a result of using a higher quality
physician, combined with the difficulty of identifying him as such,
may not be great enough to "justify" the time and trouble of a busy
man.45 Moreover the psychic, not to say psychosomatic, costs of care-
fully scrutinizing physician performance may not be negligible.
The point of this digression is not to discourage concern with
quality of medical care nor to advocate unquestioned reliance upon
consumer choice in directing the allocation of physician time. Rather
it is to stress the uncertainty of the strength of the public's revealed
preference for superior medical care. Clearly most people will insist
on having access to good—even "the best"—medical care once itis
identified as such. But many of these same people continue to smoke
cigarettes, and so do superior doctors. The evidence that links ciga-
rette smoking to lung cancer, heart and other diseases is at least as
strong as that relating physician quality to any or all aspects of health.
44 The importance of consumer time as an element in the cost of consuming a
particular item is stressed by G. S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time,"
Economic Journal, September 1965, pp. 493—517.
45 A spectacular illustration of this point is afforded by the failure of physicians
to detect early cancer in themselves. See Robert Sutherland, Cancer: the Significance
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Thealready weak link between physician quality and health is
further attenuated, and greatly, by the difficulty of identifying physi-
cian superiority.46 Consequently, itis neither surprising nor neces-
sarily irrational to prefer a pleasant manner or some combination of
lower fees and more time per contact to brusque efficiency hopefully
combined with superior knowledge. On the other hand, I would not
be prepared to bet that there would not be a substantial shift of de-
mand (at current fees) if the rankings made in a study of the Peterson-
Clute type were made public. Moreover, within limits (stated below)
I would favor improving quality of care whatever the state of con-
sumer preferences.
In a nutshell, a very important obstacle that the market must over-
come in delivering an "adequate" supply of high quality medical care
is the scant premium in time and trouble the individual consumer
is prepared to pay for superior quality. This is not at all incompatible
with a strong consensus that government—or somebody—ought to make
the effort to insure that all dispensers of medical care be of high
quality. Indeed, I suspect that much of the demand for licensure of
medics springs from the (mistaken) belief that this insures high qual-
ity care regardless of how a (licensed) physician is But so
long as prospective patients act as though they didn't care much
about physician quality, the market cannot be expected to guarantee
that physicians will meet the "extra-market" quality standards of
public health officials, medical school professors and concerned citi-
zens; hence the role for presumably expert intermediaries, such as
health plans, in improving quality of care.
Productivity and Quality of Care
It is frequently argued that group practice is both more efficient
and provides a higher standard of care than solo practice.48 If so, the
4°Thedifficulty of appraising the quality of a physician can be readily appreci-
ated by anyone even casually perusing evaluative studies such as those of Peterson
et al, op. cit., or Clute, op. cit. And these very careful studies did not attempt to
estimate the differential effect on patient health of differential physician quality.
47Clute,cit., Chapter 25, gives an excellent discussion of this point and offers
proposals for revamping the entire system of licensure.
48Forexample see Fein, cit., pp. 94—104,orH. M. and A. R. Somers, Doctors,
Patients, and Health Insurance, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1961, pp. 487—
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substitution of group for solo practice will tend to increase measured
productivity. But granting for the moment that group practice is more
efficient (in terms of input-output relations), it is by no means clear
that quality of care is superior. The allegations of Fein, Somers and
Somers and others concerning the superior quality of care under group
practice refer only to certain technical aspects of care. Weinerman
states that in the few studies made thus far
more personalized care is ascribed to the independent practitioners and better
technical standards to the group physicians.. .. Themeager evidence to
date suggests that independent and general practice is more acceptable from
the patient's point of view, while specialty and group practice provide an
objectively more rational and efficient standard of professional
Though the evidence to support it may be meager, this statement
is not implausible. If it (the statement) should be true, it follows that
although the secular drift toward specialization and group practice
may have improved the quality of care in a technical sense, it may
have worsened it in terms of the "incidental" satisfaction furnished
(some) patients. Many, perhaps most, people would insist that the
gain far outweighs the loss. That is, many people believe itis the
principal business of doctors to heal those "really" sick (i.e., having
specific organic malfunctions) and that what they do for hypochon-
driacs, or individuals with vague complaints of which they are un-
likely to die, is decidedly less important. While I do not necessarily
dissent from this value judgment, I should like to point Out some of
its implications.
The outlook on health problems that underlies this value judgment
rigidly dichotomizes people into the (organically) ill and the healthy.
The sick may be further divided into those who can be helped and
those who can't. In this view of the world, the doctor is best fulfilling
his function when he is tending the curably ill. There is considerable
evidence that the utility function of the typical doctor reflects this
value judgment. Doctors have been found to express an overwhelm-
ing preference for dealing with patients with specific organic com-
plaints; in the medical sub-culture the "crock"is abhorred from
49E.R. Weinerman, "Research into the Organization of Medical Practice," Mi!-
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studentdays on.5° Thus physicians tend to give priority to those wh.o
"need" them, and whom they know how to help.
But what if, as many believe, there is no simple dichotomy between
organic and inorganic illness? It may well be that many complaints,
categorized as psychogenic, have an organic basis that is difficult to
ascertain. Because itisdifficult to diagnose these complaints, and
because often they are psychosomatic, the physician is uncertain as to
whether there is a course of treatment that will benefit the patient
and believes that even if there were, he would have little chance of
finding it. In other words, in deciding how to allocate his time among
his patients, the physician is confronted with a distribution of proba-
bilities of benefiting patients, each probability conditional upon the
initial diagnosis. The highest probabilities are for diagnoses in which
he is confident and for which there is a generally accepted method
of treatment; doubt either as to diagnosis or to treatment reduces the
probability of a successful outcome.
The marginal utility, to the physician, of using his time to help a
given patient depends not only upon the compound probability of
being able to make a correct diagnosis and find a course of treatment
that will improve the patient, but also upon the degree to which he
thinks the patient will benefit, upon the importance he attaches to
the contribution he believes he can make to the patient's welfare, and
upon the fee he earns. A physician who maximized pecuniary income
would be concerned only with the last item, and would allocate his
time so that an extra minute spent with any patient would yield the
same income. This is a possible model of behavior, but I doubt that
many doctors follow it.
One reason is that the growing importance of medical care insur-
ance has made it increasingly difficult to devote more time to one
patient than to another with the same illness, and charge correspond-
ingly more for Another reason is that most doctors have always
50SeeW. Martin, "Preferences for Types of Patients," in R. K. Merton, et al.,
The Student-Physician, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 189—197;S. W. Bloom, The
Doctor and His Patient, New York, 1963, p. 36 (and the references in p. 51, n. 9);
H. S. Becker et al., Boys in White, Chicago, 1961, pp. 316—329; 0. L. Peterson et aL,
cit., p. 41.
51Charginga higher total fee for spending a larger amount of time is not dis-
criminating; indeed, under a fee for service method of payment, failing to charge
more for more time spent would be discriminatory. However, insurance companies118Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
sought the nonpecuniary satisfactions of professional esteem and pa-
tient gratitude, as well those of money income.52 These satisfactions
are mainly those of healing, and of contributing to medical knowledge;
in this the physician's utility function is quite similar to that of an
economist or of almost any other professional. In pursuit of non-
pecuniary satisfactions, physicians tend to seek either those cases where
they are confident their skills will prove fruitful(i.e., where they
expect to derive the satisfactions of success), or those which present
interesting diagnostic or therapeutic Also, important
people whom the doctor wishes to cultivate for social reasons, because
of the indirect effect on his practice or for other reasons, get a dis-
proportionate share of his time."
But the ordinary middle-class person with a variety of vague middle-
and health plans may refuse (see Clute, op. cit., pp. 198—200) to pay more than a
prescribed maximum for treating a specified condition.
It is generally agreed that physicians discriminate in setting fees, charging the
rich more. The fact that some of their service is rendered free (for charity) makes
the allegation of price discrimination highly persuasive. However if,as seems
plausible, they spend more time with richer patients and give them prompter
appointments (i.e.,cost them less in waiting time), then failing to charge them
somewhat more than poorer ones would be discriminatory. This does not destroy
the arguments of Kessel (R. A. Kessel, "Price Discrimination in Medicine," Journal
of Law and Economics, October 1958, pp. 20—53), but it does reduce their force.
52Inone sense this statement is obvious; there is an undeniable validity to the
Arrow-Parsons contention that the role of physician requires that those who per.
form it consider the interest of the patient as well as—or ahead of—their own.
However, this image has been tarnished by the wide variety of money-making
expedients to which physicians have resorted, and the hypocrisy that has surrounded
the activities of their professional organizations. Citations in support of the state-
ment in the text could fill a volume, but not a few could also be found that would
support dissent. Rather than offer a long and inevitably indecisive argument, I shall
let the statement in the text stand unsupported.
Theimportance of the interesting case, both to medical students and practic.
ing physicians, is indicated in Boys 12 White,cit. The concern with "interesting
cases" is an aspect of the increasingly scientific preoccupation of the medical com-
munity; it reflects "disease orientation" rather than "patient orientation."
54Inextreme cases, such as the royal family in Britain, the amount of attention
paid by physicians is notorious.
'The late Lord Evans is said to have encouraged the privileged public to treat
consultants as GPs, with his readiness to go to Buckingham Palace for trivial
matters that could have been left to other and lesser royal doctors. 'He was a
hell of a nice guy, but if anyone sneezed at Buck House he used to go there,'
said another doctor disapprovingly." Ferris, op. cit., p. 36.
In the United States, the President has a resident physician in the White House.
The pride of the physicians of movie stars and the like strongly suggests that these
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agedcomplaints is likely to find doctors curt, expensive (per minute
of contact), difficult to see, and not helpful. The physician's defense
is that he can't do much for them, and probably there is nothing
organically wrong with them anyway. Granted both contentions, there
is still some chance that if a physician took the time and trouble
thoroughly to investigate these vague complaints they could be rem-
edied. And I suspect that many people now denied this type of treat-
ment, would be willing to pay a "market price" to obtain How-
ever, they are thwarted by physician unwillingness to embark upon
such programs of uncertain therapy.
Such (alleged) reluctance by physicians does not indicate irrational-
ity. The alternative, billing a patient for the full cost of a physician's
time, would often result in unusually high charges which patients
might be reluctant to pay if—as is very probable—the treatment did
no good. Complaints about physicians who keep patients returning
for treatment without benefit are legion. It is easy, and sometimes cor-
rect, to blame physician greed for such occurrences; but it is often
hard to know whether it was the physician or the patient who urged
the course of treatment, and what was the understanding on which
the treatment commenced.5°
Elaborate advance contracts to insure payment would surely put
the physician in an unfavorable light with his professional peers as
well as with laymen. Similarly, incentive type contracts, with a great
premium placed upon success, would run grave risk of being consid-
ered unethical,5T as well as encountering serious problems of proving
55 The difficulty of getting a physician to make a housecall is indicative of the
situation, High though the cost of housecalls may be in most locations, they do
not appear to have gone high enough, relative to the prices of office calls or
pital visits, to induce physicians willingly to make them.
56 See R. H. Blum, The Management of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, New
York, 1960, especially pp. 132—138.
57 The medical world view is nonprobabilistic and strongly biased in favor of
avoiding errors of commission ("do no harm") even at the cost of increasing the
probability of errors of omission. (See T. J. Scheff, "Preferred Errors in Diagnosis,"
Medical Care, August 1964, pp. 166—172.) Moreover, the physician's role as ex-
pounded by Parsons, op. cit., is probably irreconcilable with a game theoretic ap-
proach to therapy which was frankly avowed to the patient. And the physician's
superior knowledge would make basing the size of fee on the outcome of the treat-
ment most unfair to the patient. But, fair or not, unusually high fees (reflecting
improbable cures) would probably be rejected by the courts, and frowned on by
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success. Hence it is prudent to avoid this whole set of problems by
sticking to conventional courses of therapy and conventional bills.
The consequence of thisisto ration time so asto discourage
"crocks." This is normally done by making them wait long periods
for and being brief when dealing with them. This has
the effect of raising the marginal cost, to an undesirable patient, of
obtaining a given amount of a physician's time without raising the
pecuniary return to the physician. This apparent paradox reflects the
fact that the process of producing many services, including medical,
involves the utilization of a variety of unpaid inputs. Of particular
importance is the time spent in travelling to the physician's office and
in waiting there..5°
Waiting for an appointment also involves some costs not usually
appreciated. Delivery next week is not as good as immediate delivery;
in a world where every good and service could be bought in a market,
a commodity delivered next week would be different from one deliv-
ered today and would be bought in a different (though related) mar-
ket. Delayed appointments with a doctor are billed at the same fee as
prompt ones; the queueing procedure is usually "first come, first
served" for available dates, with "emergencies" being taken Out of
turn, causing increased waiting time to those already scheduled.6°
The effect of this time rationing system, on the measurement of
changes in output and productivity in the medical care industry is as
follows: secular increases in productivity in part reflect a.shift in the
locus of treatment from the home to office and hospitaL This shift
has made it possible to save the doctor much of the time formerly
spent in travelling from house to house; 61thesame shift has also
58I.e.,make them wait a long period to get an appointment and sometimes make
them spend a long interval in the waiting room also.
59Thishas already been remarked in n. 44. Also see V. R. Fuchs, "The Contribu-
tion of Health Services to the American Economy," Milbank Memorial Quarterly,
October 1966, pp. 73—74.
60Ofcourse, the doctor has considerable latitude in deciding what is to be con-
sidered an emergency.
61Somersand Somers, op. cit., pp. 48—49 present data suggesting that home visits
declined from 40 per cent of all nonhospital visits in 1928 to 8 per cent in 1957.
Mrs. A. A. Scitovsky (Changes inthe Costs of Treatment of Selected Illnesses,
1951/52 to 1964/65, Palo Alto, California, May 1967, Table 8, p. 68) reports that
in 1951—52, 34.7 per cent of all, physician visits in treating otitis media (in children)
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madeit possible for the doctor to be supplemented by a battery of
assistants (nurses, laboratory technicians, secretaries, etc.) who further
enhance his productivity. But this gain is at least partially offset by
the increase in time spent by patients in travelling to and waiting for
the doctor; this increased input should be considered in measuring
productivity change.
The increase in productivity in medical care has been indissolubly
connected with a great improvement in the nature of the product and,
because of a combination of rising income, education and medical care
insurance, a vast increase in demand. For reasons already indicated
this has involved a relative shift in supply of physician time to those
illnesses that are capable of effective treatment and away from those
that are not. This has had (see below) the effect of reducing the avail-
ability of medical care to higher income groups relative to lower,
which is tantamount to a redistribution of real income. In other words,
the increase in measured productivity has been partially due to a sub-
stitution of poor-man's medicine for rich-man's. Allowing for this will
inevitably reduce estimates of the productivity increase that would
have occurred with an unchanged, homogenous output.
PROLEGOMENA TO A MODEL OF THE MEDICAL CARE SECTOR
AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It is a truism, or should be, that to measure productivity change it is
necessary to have an explicit model of the economy or economic
sector under consideration. Itis convenient to define productivity
changes in terms of shifts in a production function, but to speak of a
sector's (firm's, economy's) production function is to assume that the
problems of specifying its form and operationally defining its variables
have been solved. But these problems are never simple, and that is
especially the case in this sector. As its title indicates, this section does
not attempt to offer a model of the medical care sector. It attempts
only to discuss certain peculiarities of medical care production that
must be considered in constructing such a model.
The Entrepreneur and His Objectives
The two hardest questions in the theory of production are "who is
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so difficult, and the answers appear to vary so much from one situation
to another, that textbook discussions almost invariably bypass them
and hasten on to discuss the constrained optimization of a specified
maximand. Here, let us attempt to face the harder questions.
Identifying the man in charge of dispensing medical care seems
easy. By law, custom and common belief, medical care is what the
doctor orders.62 Reality is not that simple: the relation of physician
to surgeon; of both to hospitals, medical plans, and insurance com-
panies greatly complicates the situation. Nevertheless, the actual posi-
tion of the doctor and expository convenience both suggest that the
doctor be considered as the entrepreneur. This specification refers to
the United States at the present time and the past; but it is not the
only conceivable arrangement, and the situation is subject to change.63
Assuming the doctor to be entrepreneur of a firm producing medical
care,64 what are his objectives? To circumvent methodological dispute,
assume him to be a utility maximizer, but compelled to operate under
special constraints. (If one wished to.posit that he was a satisficer with
respect to money income, the subsequent discussion would not be
altered.) One particular and very important constraint upon the phy-
sician's actions is the heavy penalty imposed for certain types of un-
conventional behavior, without adequate counterbalancing rewards
for unusual achievement that might result from such behavior. This
introduces a marked aversion to particular types of uncertainty. For
example, failure of an unorthodox method of treatment may bring
malpractice suits, the hostility of the local medical society, or both,
which can severely injure a physician by denying him referrals, access
to hospitals, and even loss of license to practice. Such loss is very simi-
lar to "gambler's ruin" in a fair At the very least, failure of a
long course of treatment is likely to make it difficult to collect a bill
for the value of physician time spent. On the other hand, success
62 For example, in the American Medical Association's study of the cost of medi-
cal care the physician is identified as a "contractor" of goods and services for the
patient. Report of the Commission on the Cost of Medical Care, Chicago, 1964,
Volume I, p. 16.
63 See, for example, the recommendations of Clute, op. cit., Ch. 25.
64 Implying that hospitals, consulting specialists, etc., are all hired or purchased
inputs.
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againstlong odds can gain the practicing physician very little; 66 be-
cause he cannot advertise his success, he cannot profit through higher
fees or more patients, nor can he block the swarm of imitators. As a
result, the practicing physician has a strong tendency to encourage
patients with standard organic ailments for which there is a recognized
course of procedure, preferably one that brings symptomatic relief.67
This brings him kudos, both from patients and other physicians, add-
ing to his money income and to his nonpecuniary satisfaction. Con-
versely, he will discourage other types of patients.68
Utility maximization by the physician leads to rather special behav-
ior in the field of price setting. Although doctors are in many respects
a classic example of a guild, they have not been greatly concerned with
maintaining minimum prices. This is due partly to the universal ac-
ceptance of price discrimination, and partly to the fact that continuing
to serve in the face of nonpayment or partial payment is an effective
form of de facto price cutting. Instead of focussing attention on price
behavior, the medical profession has stressed the importance of main-
taining high professional standards which has involved limitation of
numbers.
By its system of induction through medical schools, hospital ap-
pointments, etc., the profession inculcates an image of the successful
doctor whom neophytes strive to emulate. These paradigms are not
money income maximizers, though their incomes are notoriously high.
Given the opportunities for price discrimination inherent in medical
practice, money income maximization would imply an attempt to
eliminate each patient's consumer surplus from being treated by the
66 This is not the case in a research Situation. However, the ordinary practicing
physician is not engaged in research and those who are so engaged are interested
only in patients with ailments germane to their research. The person who en-
counters a doctor with a research interest in his complaint is indeed fortunate, and
gets a kind of treatment normally unobtainable. Of course, such a patient must
bear with the inconveniences that typically attend a research situation.
87 Organic complaints are preferred because psychosomatic patients are often
psychologically disturbed, and suit-prone.
68 The conservative bias of the physician, both in selecting patients and in treat-
ing them, strongly discourages attempts to increase money income by deliberately
giving substandard treatment, although there are spectacular examples to the con-
trary. Detectably substandard performance incurs risk of collegial disapproval with
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doctor in question rather than by any other physician.69 But this is
not what is attempted.
One very important reason why it is not attempted is that hospitals
and medical schools are eleemosynary institutions which draw their
support from the very same social groups whose members pay the
highest fees. The leading medical practitioners who treat the wealthi-
est patients are symbiotically associated with these institutions, both
drawing and lending prestige through the affiliation. Consequently,
they must leave their patient-patrons feeling pleased with their treat-
ment, personal as well as medical. This institutional necessity has
much to do with the "collectivity-orientation" emphasized by Parsons.
A second reason why physicians do not maximize money income is
that the professionally approved doctor-patient relationship is one
whose terms are dictated by the doctor. Ideally, the physician is sup-
posed to treat the patient in accordance with the precepts of his call-
ing, irrespective of what the patient wants; the dissatisfied patient is
to be invited to go elsewhere. The patient is to feel privileged that
his physician will treat him and is to reward the physician not only
in money but also by following instructions. This relationship requires
that the physician be virtually indifferent as to whether a patient
leaves him.7° Obviously this is most likely to happen when the physi-
cian has more patients than he wants and is therefore inconsistent
with maximizing the amount of money income he obtains from each
one and hence in total. Unless the physician is in this position vis-à-vis
his patients he will be tempted to perform operations or prescribe
drugs that patients demand, even though in his judgment the treat-
ment would do harm.71
The posture of "dominating the patient through economic inde-
pendence" is not possible for all doctors. Beginners, those inept at
attracting patients, those in locations of relative excess supply and the
greedy everywhere are not able to follow the light of professional con-
69Thisdoes not imply that the physician could succeed in this goal, even if he
sought it. If he sought this objective, the physician and each of his patients would
be in the position of bilateral monopolists.
70Ifthe physician charged all patients the same price for a given service, this
condition would imply that he charged less than the market equilibrium price in
order to ration services among his patients.
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sciencesingle-mindedly. Normally, however, as a physician becomes
established his case load and income rise until he can comfortably
assume the approved posture of economic independence. Indeed, pride
or group. pressure often cause assumption of this posture well before
it is financially appropriate.72
A fInal word on income maximization. Professional ethics refers to
the relation between a doctor and his own patients or, at most, to his
obligation to those whom he encounters in an emergency. Jt does not
require him to accept particular patients or to locate himself where
he might be needed. In a forthcoming paper, two of my colleagues
and I find substantial evidence for the proposition that the locational
decisions of physicians are compatible with a desire to maximize money
income.73 However, thisis not incompatible with pursuit of other
objectives in fee setting and allocation of work time.
Method of Payment and Its Consequences
The conventional theory of production assumes that the productive
efficiency of an input unit is independent of its rate of reward. The
performance of both human and nonhuman inputs is assumed to be
completely insensitive to the effect of pecuniary incentives. The impact
of incentives falls solely upon the entrepreneur who is assumed to be
operating upon the production function but whose services are not
among its arguments. The effect of incentive payments on the produc-
tivity of employed workers remains largely unexplored in economic
theory though there have been many incidental observations on the
subject.
The key role of the physician in the production of medical care
would suggest that his method of compensation would affect his out-
put. And, as we have seen, it does; but it would do so to an even
greater degree if physicians were money income maximizers. The
desire to achieve professional esteem leads him to charge less than the
"traffic will bear." This enables the physician, in both fee for service
72Acceptinga salaried post (e.g., with a group of physicians) while building con-
tacts with patients and colleagues and accumulating some capital often enables the
beginning doctor to reconcile the demands of professional rectitude with economic
necessity.
L. Benham, A. Maurizi and M. W. Reder, "Location and Migration of Medics:
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and salaried situations, to resist patient demands and to give treatment
in accordance with conventional medical standards.
However, since fee for service patients generally pay more per 'tinci-
dent," they expect and receive more of physician time, and can insist
upon being treated by their own doctor. This is in accord with ac-
cepted medical practice and were it not the case few patients would
voluntarily choose this more expensive method of care. But the amount
of physician time the patient can demand, even when he is willing
to pay standard hourly rates, is rationed by the physician wh.o also
controls the kind of treatment offered.
It may be that general surgery provides an important exception to
this picture. As already indicated it is widely believed that shortage of
demand at prevailing fee schedules has frequently led to medically
inadvisable operations. This belief is consonant with the overwhelm-
ing opinion of surgeons that there is an excess supply of general sur-
geons, but that such excess does not exist in most of the various spe-
cialized branches of surgery.74 The belief is further supported by the
frequent allegations that surgeons split fees with referring physicians,
and by the complaints of physicians that per hour of time surgeons
are greatly overpaid relative to
In brief there is a variety of reports concerning general surgery that
suggest the existence of the type of situation that would arise if a
service were priced higher than the level at which demand equalled
supply: i.e., attempt to stimulate demand for the service (by encourag-
ing unnecessary operations), price-cutting (fee-splitting) and attempts
to exclude competitors (nonspecialists) from the market. Superficially
at least, it would seem that the market situation in surgery was quite
different from that in the other branches of medicine.
The contrast between the (allegedly) loose market in surgery and
In1962, the American College of Surgeons sent a mailed questionnaire to
20,000 of its fellows of whom 65 per cent replied. In substance the question asked
was whether the respondent thought there were in his community "too many," "just
enough," or "not enough" of the following types of surgeons: General Surgeons;
Obstetricians-Gynecologists;Orthopedists;Urologists;Ophthamologists. An over-
whelming majority of both General Surgeons and other surgeons thought there
were too many General Surgeons; but for all other fields (except Obstetrics) the
prevailing view was that there were too few rather than too many practitioners.
Eulletin of American College of Surgeons, November—December 1963, pp. 354—355.
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thetight one in most other branches of medicine is quite in keeping
with the behavior pattern underlying the allocation of hospital beds
mentioned earlier.
The Eleemosynary Character of Medical Care
A predominant characteristic of the medical care industry isits
eleemosynary nature. This characteristic affects not only physicians but
auxiliary personnel as well. Nonprofessional workers (orderlies, nurses'
aides, etc.) have always been among the lowest paid workers in the
community. This is partly because of the unskilled nature of the work,
but it is also a reflection of the ability of eleemosynary institutions to
escape the minimum wage laws and conventions that normally set
floors under the hourly wage rates of this part of the labor force.
Yet another factor working to hold down labor costs in this sector
is the large amount of unpaid labor it can draw upon. This is related
to the great ability of this sector to lower the quality of the nonmedi-
cal aspects of hospital and office care. 1f nurses are too few, patients
can be allowed to wait longer; if they are incompetent, patients may
be inconvenienced but, hopefully, not injured medically. To some
extent, deficiencies of auxiliary personnel can be offset by greater use
of unpaid assistance, especially by members of patients' families. But
in any event, supplicants dare not be complainers. This tradition is
dying under the spread of hospital insurance, but slowly and hard.
The eleemosynary aspects of providing medical care affect demand
as well as supply. Medical care has never been considered as an object
of choice which one could consume as means and taste permitted.
Until this century it was something that ought to be provided by
charity, and more recently a service to which a human is entitled by
right. This right has been enforced through public provision of medi-
cal care and through semicompulsory medical care insurance. Both
government and insurance companies strongly resist increases in the
price of medical services because of the need to hold down taxes or
monthly payments. Since professional standards and public surveil-
lance both limit deterioration in the quality of medical care per se,
the pressure of cost increases is deflected, at least partially, from rais-
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Some Conjectures on the Recent Economic History of Medical Care
Though I cannot prove it, I suspect that prior to World War II
rather few doctors were in the position of being independent of a
credit worthy patient. Many (most?) patients were in the position of
being in arrears or paying "what they were able," and toward them
the doctor could maintain the posture of independent benefactor if
he wished. The pre-Worid War II position of the doctor was also
greatly affected by the long secular adjustment to the rise in profes-
sional standards following the Flexner report: this adjustment was
reflected in a gradual decline in the over-all physician-population ratio
as well as in a decided relative improvement in the qualifications of
the lower part of the professionJ6 But in the meanwhile (circa 19 15—
1945), the large stock of previously licensed (largely unspecialized)
physicians continued to render time consuming if ineffectual service
to middle-class citizens willing to pay the standard fees. Others who
could not pay full fees, were treated in a manner varying with the
attitude of the physician.
Changes in this situation, occurring by the slow process of attrition,
were greatly accelerated by World War II. The postwar physician was
appreciably better trained, more specialized and more strongly ori-
ented toward his colleagues, their hospitals and the standards of the
profession than his predecessor. Because of improvements in apparatus,
chemotherapy and drugs he was much better able to obtain visible
results from treatment.
On the demand side, he was confronted by a clientele that was
better educated and with far higher per capita incomes than their
predecessors. Moreover the social reforms of the 1930's and the sub-
stantially full employment maintained since 1940 worked to increase
family income most in that sector of the population where income
elasticity of demand for medical care was greatest. Demand was fur-
ther enhanced by the spread of health insurance and prepayment
plans which. served both to lower the marginal cost of care and to
spread knowledge of its potentialities.
The percentage increase in demand for medical care at constant
76Onthis point see M. Friedman and S. Kuznets, Income from Independent Pro-
fessional Practice, New York, NBER, 1945, pp. 8—21; also R. H. Shryock, Medical
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priceswas far greater than the percentage increase in number of
physicians during the postwar period. In response to this, on-going
changes in the pattern of practice were greatly accelerated; house calls
were drastically reduced in favor of office and hospital visits; in office
and hospital, assistants of all kinds both economized the doctor's time
and minimized his personal contact with patients. The tendency
toward depersonalization of the doctor-patient relation was further
accelerated by the steadily increasing degree of specialization and
group practice which replaced "the" doctor by a team, none of whom
remembered the patient's name or face.
The increasing degree of specialization has facilitated growth of
physician income. Services previously performed by an individual, but
less specialized, physician have been increasingly delegated to special-
ists each of whom sends a bill. This increased division of labor, has
often reflected the application of new techniques of treatment, which
probably improved the quality of care. However, this same division
of labor led to a more rapid increase in the cost of curing specific
ailments than could have been inferred from the movement of the
medical component of the CPLT7
The comparatively moderate rise in physician fees (as recorded in
the CPI) since World War II has often been noticed.78 In part, this
(relative) stability is misleading because of improved collections, and
because relatively more patients paid the standard fees reflected in the
CPI.79 But some of the same forces that improved collections and
See A. A. Scitovsky, op. cit.
78 For example, see J. W. Garbarino, "Prices and Productivity in the Medical
Market," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1959, pp. 6—10.
A. A. Scitovsky, op. cit., Kiarman, cit., pp. 151—153. Mrs. Scitovsky ("Changes
in the Costs of Treatment," op. cit., Table 7, p. 18) reports that at the Palo Alto
Medical Clinic, in 1951—52, in treating otitis media, the average fee paid for an
office visit was 68.5 per cent of the customary or standard fee and the average fee
for a home visit was 88.8 per cent of the customary fee. In 1964—65, the average
fee was per cent of the customary fee for office visits and 102.8 per cent for
home visits.
Mrs. Scitovsky also reports (op. cit., Table 5, p. 46) that in 195 1—52, the average
fee for an appendectomy was 91 per cent of the customary fee; by 1964—65, the
average fee for an appendectomy had risen to 100.5 per cent of the customary fee.
In 1951—52 the average for a radical mastectomy was 89.8 per cent of the customary
fee and in 1964—65, the corresponding percentage was 99.0 per cent (op. cit., p. 117,
Table 5). However, for maternity care in normal pregnancies the average fee was
100 per cent of the customary fee both in 1951—52 and in 1964—65 (op. cit., p. 81,
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diminished the number of charity or quasi-charity patients have also
inhibited increases in scheduled fees; i.e., the relative growth of third
party payers (insurance companies and government agencies). Rather
than engage in complicated negotiations with such entities, whose
interest in physician goodwill is subordinate to that of minimizing
payment of claims, increasing "productivity" has been an easier way
of adjusting to market forces. The effect on physician incomes has
been much like the increase in hourly earnings of piece workers that
results from increases in output per man hour.
Productivity Gains, and the Nature of Medical Care
Medical care has two aspects: that which deals with the organic
ailments of a patient and that which provides the patient with vari-
ous amenities, including physician time to explore various personal
problems only uncertainly related to physical distress. Shifting physi-
cian time from the latter aspect to the former undoubtedly increases
the number of patients treated and probably increases measured pro-
ductivity per physician Such a shift may not reduce the health
care available to anyone, or the benefits to the gainers may be consid-
ered to outweigh the harm done to the losers. As I have argued earlier,
the implicit value judgment underlying the behavior of most physi-
cians is either that treating organic ailments is more important than
alternative professional uses of their time, or that they can accomplish
more (per hour) by dealing with such ailments. Thus a sharp increase
in the number of persons with specific organic ailments per physician
available, as during World War II, may often lead to a parallel in-
crease in physician productivity, as treatment is accelerated and crocks
are discouraged more emphatically. This is what underlies Ginzberg's
assertion that "the effective use of physician manpower depends in the
first instance on a taut supply of physicians."
However, to say that there is a sufficient number of physicians to
treat all serious organic disease that can be treated—if anyone said it—
would not imply the absence of physician shortage. For if the atten-
tion of a physician is withheld from someone (with an ailment not
80Thisassumes that physicians do not charge patients in proportion to the time
they give them, but charge less to those who use more time. If so, a shift to briefer
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havinga specific organic diagnosis) willing to pay for it at its "marke,t
price," then in an important sense there is a shortage of supply. Let
us grant the value judgment that the present stock of physicians
should be allocated so as to maximize some function of "community
health" into which each individual's health enters independently of
his wealth. There may, nevertheless, be too few physicians to handle
the nonurgent medical demands of reasonably well-to-do individuals
at prices they would be willing to pay, and that would yield a suf-
ficient return on the cost of physician training to induce a supply
adequate to provide for these (presently unsatisfied) demands, without
reducing the services anyone is presently receiving. What is suggested
is the possibility that the institutional difficulty of .charging market
rates for treating patients with diagnostically difficult or psychosomatic
illness requiring lengthy treatment of uncertain efficacy, may have
lead to an underestimate of the demand for such
Recognition of this possibility has been impeded by (justified) con-
cern with the inadequate medical care available to low income groups.
Concern over possible shortagesphysicians and other inputs of
medical care has almost always been allied with concern over the
adequacy of care for lower income groups. But i.f the argument of this
section is correct, progress in providing for the medical needs of the
poor may have involved a reduction in the physician time available
to other segments of the population. This reallocation of time is likely
to be reflected as an increase in physician productivity; it may not
affect adversely any indexes of physical health, but it will be associated
with an altered state of patient-doctor relations that is one aspect o,f
quality of care.
81Thereader will note that I am suggesting the possibility of this particular
market failure, not asserting that it has occurred. Looked at in a somewhat dif-
Ferent way what I am suggesting is that given their high money incomes and the
prevailing taste for agreeable patients, few physicians (other than psychiatrists)
Feel able to discriminate financially against unpleasant ones (crocks usually are, or
soon become, unpleasant) sufficiently,to induce their willing acceptance except
(perhaps) when demand is slack. Of course an undesirable patient cannot always
be immediately identified as such, and since few physicians are willing summarily
to dismiss a patient, they must discourage them gradually.
Unfortunately I can think of no practical way of testing this conject9re on ob-
served market behavior, though it would not be difficult to develop experimental
situations in which relevant evidence might be obtained.132Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
DISCUSSION
HERBERT E. KLARMAN, The Johns Hopkins University
Professor Reder's paper represents a conceptual contribution to an
important subject area in health economics—the definition of output
and the measurement of change in productivity.1 To the economist
such matters are of prime intellectual interest; they are also central
to the sensible consideration of such issues as the development of
effective formulas for reimbursing hospitals, the soundness of actuarial
projections under Medicare, future requirements for additional health
services personnel, and the comparative costs of alternative methods
of treating patients with mental illness.
PECULIAR CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUSTRY
The peculiar characteristics of medical care that require special con-
sideration, Reder states, are consumer ignorance and the practice of
price discrimination by producers.
Ignorance
Reder's discussion of the physician and -his complex relationship
with the patient properly extends far beyond an elaboration of con-
sumer ignorance. One might add that sometimes the physician is igno-
rant, too, and must rely on empirical measures and on the placebo
effect. The importance of forms of medical care organization, particu-
larly the nonprofit hospital and its manifold relationship with the
practicing physician, is noted. The prepaid group practice arrange-
ment receives close to the almost standard "it stands to reason" treat-
ment, in which its superiority is presumed in the absence of contra-
vening evidence.
The discussion of the attitudes and role of the physician is interest-
ing but, in my opinion, too accepting of the position of medical edu-
cators. The view that the physician's task is to treat and cure organic
illness is too narrow. The physician can do other useful things, includ-
1HermanM. Somers and Anne R. Somers, A Program for Research in Health
Economics (a background paper prepared for a conference held by the Brookings
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ingmanaging patients whom he cannot cure, preventing unnecessary
exacerbation and complications, alleviating pain, and slowing down
normal processes of decline. Listening to patients—taking their medical
history—remains essential to the practice of good medicine, however
scientific it may otherwise be.
Price Discrimination
The extraordinary growth of voluntary health insurance and the
advent of Medicare have combined to accelerate the decline of price
discrimination in medicine. Moreover, as Reder pOifltS Out, its extent
was probably overstated even in its prime.
Economists interested in studying medical care prices could con-
tribute a great deal by inquiring into certain other aspects, such as
the effects on price and quantity of fee schedules, of deductibles and
coinsurance of varying amounts, of health insurance with varying
degrees of coverage, of low physician incomes during prolonged pe-
riods of training, etc.
Reder's speculative discussion of the possible effects of the fee-for-
service method of payment, such as fee splitting and inadequate allo-
cation of time to postgraduate education, is imaginative. It strikes
me as oversimple, in that there may be excessive surgery in the absence
of fee splitting and conceivably also fee splitting without excessive
surgery. As for postgraduate education, most specialists are paid fee-
for-service and are held to keep up professionally. The reason lies in
their strong hospital ties, not in taking time to attend formal courses.
REDER'S SCHEME
According to my understanding, Reder proposes that the following
be done to measure change in the productivity of medical care.
1. Express the change as the ratio of change in physical output
over the change in deflated inputs.
2. Define output preferably as services available to a subscriber to
a comprehensive health insurance plan. Alternatively, in more real-
istic circumstances, express output in terms of the number of episodes
of illness treated.
3. Adjust the above ratio by taking account of changes in quality.
Five measures of quality are variously suggested: life years gained,134Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
rates of undetected illness, appropriateness of the process of diagnosis
and treatment, patient satisfaction, and work days lost. Marginal rates
of substitution (trade offs) among the several measures of quality are
to be obtained in a manner not specified.
CRITIQUE
In outline the scheme appeals to me as reasonable and workable. In
detail I have a few doubts and several disagreements.
Unit of Output
It is important, I believe, that a position be taken on what consti-
tutes output in the health services industry. Is it the services rendered
by physicians and other personnel or is it the change effected in the
health status of persons? In Reder's scheme the former is output in
the first instance, while the latter qualifies as an adjustment in quality.
I agree with this decision, because I can see no way of devising a pro-
portionate relationship over time between health services and health
status. Moreover, the ascertaining of such relationships is necessarily
the object of special study, while the numerator of an index of pro-
ductivity should be calculable on a fairly routine and reproducible
basis.
What confuses me, for it is not explained, is Reder's apparent ad-
vocacy of two alternative measures of output that appear to be quite
different.
Number of Subscribers. His preferred measure is the service avail-
able to a member of a comprehensive prepaid group practice plan.
Although the quantity of services used by such a person may change
over time, as technological possibilities change and consumer tastes
and income change, the unit of output in Reder's scheme is the person
eligible for care, standardized for certain characteristics, such as age
and sex.
I can see no justification for the person as a measure of physical
output (although he may be the appropriate unit for projecting med-
ical care expenditures, for which changes in utilization are just as
important as changes in price).
Episodes of Illness. The measure of output Reder considers second
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ofthe small numbers currently enrolled in prepaid group practice
plans, is th.e number of episodes of illness treated. If the number of
episodes treated per subscriber changes, the two measures of output
are bound to differ.
Let me try to summarize the objections I can see to treating an
episode of illness as the measure of output. Perhaps further discussion
can serve to dispel them.
1. With the possible exception of some surgery, most illness cannot
be divided over time into distinct episodes.
2. Indeed, even for a given diagnostic condition episodes of illness
are variously accompanied by complications and multiple diseases,
which may outlast the episode.
3. Certain health services are completely divorced from episodes of
illness. A medical examination not prompted by symptoms is the most
obvious example.
4. Certain health services are preventive in nature. Their purpose
is to prevent the occurrence of illness. Vaccinations are an obvious
example.
5. The management of chronic diseases cannot be divided into epi-
sodes.
If a major reason for taking the subscriber to a health plan as the
unit of output is the fact that health services are increasingly pur-
chased through an insurance premium, the obverse of this argument
is that health services are not commonly paid for in terms of treatment
for an episode of illness.
A Bundle of Services. Reder dismisses the present medical care com-
ponent of the CPI, which prices specified bundles of services, as a
possible measure of output and productivity, because no provision is
made for taking account of changes in inputs. It seems to me, how-
ever, that it would be altogether in order to propose that this be done.
If so, a specified basket of medical services emerges as another possible
measure of output.
Although personally skeptical of the episode of illness approach,
I do not believe we are ready to choose any single measure of output
over the other two. More thinking is in order and certainly some
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of the three measures offers certain advantages, depending on the
problem at hand.
Adjustment for Quality
As for changes in the quality of care, I agree with Reder in making
this a second step, an adjustment, rather than a direct measure of
output.
The space given by Reder to quality is justified by its importance.
He draws on a great deal of literature concerning the medical audit
and quality assessment that economists too frequently consider outside
their purview and repeatedly demonstrates its relevance. It strikes me,
however, that Reder is perhaps less critical in his reference to this
literature than he is likely to be in a similar review of work done by
economists.
It will be helpful to recognize that the heading of quality usually
encompasses several distinctive aspects: end results, process, and amen-
ities.
I believe that it is always more meaningful to judge the quality of
medical care by its effects on health status—whether measured in terms
of gains in longevity, reduction of disability, or alleviation of pain—
than by the conformity of the diagnostic and therapeutic process to
prevailing criteria of good medical practice. At most, the latter crite-
rion should be employed when information concerning end results is
lacking. Hopefully, the lack of such information is temporary, for it
serves as a signal that there is research to be done.
I have doubts concerning one of the suggested indicators of quality,
the rate of undetected illness. In every instance it would be necessary
to know what the cost of detection is in terms of false positives,2 the
natural history of the disease in the absence of intervention, and the
availability of effective treatment for the detected condition. Even the
desirability of early cancer detection programs (prior to symptoms)
has been questioned recently on the ground that the natural history
of preinvasive lesions is not known.3
2Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, Statistics: A New Approach, Glencoe,
Iii., 1956, pp. 328—329.
3E.G. Knox,Cervical Cytology: A Scrutiny of the Evidence," in Gordon
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Itwould be useful to consider as a measure of quality the absence
of complications engendered by the medical treatment itself. Surely
iatrogenic illness ranks first among all the conditions that should be
avoided, as Florence Nightingale insisted many years ago.
In the Milbank Quarterly, a paper cited by Reder, Fuchs has shown
that an economist can perform a highly acceptable review of the
medical literatureto distinguish between existing knowledge and
claims of the efficacy of medical care. I would add that greater insist-
ence on information concerning end results might serve both to ac-
celerate research in this field and move epidemiologists away from
their emphasis on experiments of classic design (study and control
groups selected by random assignment). There is considerable room
for rough and ready, relatively dirty methods for evaluating the end
results of health services.4
Changes in the amenities appear to be easier to measure than end
results. Improvements in the amenities of medical care are to be ex-
pected, along with other elements in the standard of living. It is time
to recognize that biological need is not the only factor in the use of
health services, and that greater conveniences or lesser discomforts,
while not strictly necessary, do not represent abuses or wasteful use
of health services.
Finally, with respect to quality, it would be very useful if Reder
elaborated some possible approaches to the problem of rendering the
several measures of quality commensurate. For example, to what ex-
tent can we draw on the work that has been done in estimating the
benefits, tangible and intangible, of health service programs and per-
haps go beyond it?
INPUTS
My comments about inputs are brief.
Reder has chosen to discuss the services rendered by a physician or
under a physician's direction, rather than all personal health services,
such as those rendered by dentists, nurses when acting autonomously,
4PeterH. Rossi, "Boobytraps and Pitfalls in the Evaluation of Social Action
Programs," Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section, American Statistical Associ-
ation, 1966, Washington, D.C., pp. 127—132; Sam Shapiro, "End Result Measurement
of Quality of Medical Care," The Mit bank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2
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or pharmacists. The reason for this limitation, it appears to me, is
his undue preoccupation with health insurance and professional
licensure as the two factors that define medical care. Medical care was
provided long before the development of health insurance and would
continue to be provided if the licensure of physicians were eliminated.
Is it not sufficient to say that the health services industry comprises
whatever responsible authorities say it is and serious students of the
subject are willing to accept? Today, by virtue of pioneer work and
persistent application, the Social Security Administration is the ac-
cepted authority, and the Internal Revenue Service need not agree
with it, as it does not on such items as travel expenses. In studying
specific problems the boundaries of the industry can be modified.
The fact that items of consumption other than medical care can
and do affect health status is widely recognized. Medical care is one
avenue for improving health status. Possibilities for making substitu-
tions among means vary, depending on the particular disease entity.
The importance of this point is the heavy burden that it puts on
studies that evaluate end results. Not only is it necessary to ascertain
the effects, but also to relate them to a source.
SOME APPLICATIONS
If Reder's general scheme is followed, certain problems that seemed
intractable in the past appear to be on the road to a solution.
How to treat unnecessary surgery? Count the operation as output,
but adjust it downward for poor quality. The adjustment can exceed
the initial value of the output.
How to treat effective prevention? Clearly output in later years
is reduced. Output in the early years will be adjusted upward for
quality, most likely retroactively, in light of the accumulating evi-
dence.
How to treat costless improvements in medical care, such as early
ambulation? Output is reduced, but the gain in quality is substantial.
The latter is greater if early discharge also signifies an early return
to normal activity. Input is zero or small (the latter is due to height-
ened activity over a shorter duration). If costs were incurred in re-
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reasonto reward the producers of services for such an improvement
in quality, which is costless to them and was paid for, if at all, in the
research sector.
SUMMARY
To summarize: we have here a thoughtful, wide-ranging, and stimu-
lating discussion of a major subject area in health economics. I believe
that Reder's principal decisions are sound.
My major reservation in the economist's sphere relates to the choice
of a measure of output. My disagreements reflect largely differences
in interpreting the current status of the literature on quality. I in-
vite Reder's further efforts in devising approaches to render the
several dimensions of quality commensurate. Finally, possible appli-
cations of Reder's approach are indicated.
MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN, Harvard University
As you all know, Professor Reder's paper offers much more than
his title suggests. Reder begins by discussing a number of alternative
approaches to the measurement of productivity change in the medi-
cal care industry, but then goes on to speculate about some of the
ways in which the organization of the industry influences the produc-
tivity of medical manpower.
Because my time is short, I will restrict most of my comments to
the problems of productivity measurement. But first I would like to
call attention to some of the aspects of Reder's more general discus-
sion that 11 found particularly interesting.
Much of Reder's attention focuses on the influence that the method
of paying physicians has on their behavior. A novel feature of his
analysis is the treatment of the physician payment method as a form
of risk-sharing arrangement. Other aspects of his discussion are also
unusual. Although Reder supports the widespread criticism that fee-
for-service remuneration provides little or no• incentive for "high-
quality" medicine while encouraging unnecessary surgery and other
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generally not responsive enough to the potential market demands of
patients. In particular, Keder speculates that patients would be will-
ing to pay more for the treatment of miscellaneous psychosomatic
illnesses and for greater convenience in their care. In spite of the
fee-for-service payment method, patients' potential demand is ineffec-
tive because doctors are not income maximizers.
Reder also develops the idea that the market mechanism is cur-
rently a very imperfect allocator of medical services because potential
patients are unwilling to spend the time required to obtain adequate
information about the quality of available services. Reder's emphasis
on patients' reluctance to spend time, rather than on their inability
to understand technical information, has an important policy impli-
cation. It suggests that the government or private organizations might
be able to provide the public with information that would improve
th.e efficiency of the medical market. I would like to hear Professor
Reder expand this point.
Although there are other interesting and potentially fruitful ideas
in Reder's discussion of the factors influencing physician produc-
tivity, I want to return now to a more detailed analysis of his treat-
ment of productivity measurement.
Reder correctly emphasizes that the measurement of price and pro-
ductivity change should be in terms of the outputs of the medical care
industry and not its inputs. He therefore rejects the method currently
used in calculating the medical component of the consumer price
index. In the search for a substitute, he discusses several different
approaches to measuring the "output" and the rate of productivity
change of the medical care industry. I will consider three of these.
The first and most striking of Reder's suggested approaches is his
"cost of insurance index." Reder starts with the harmless convention
of defining the medical care industry to be coterminous with the serv-
ices provided under a broad medical insurance or prepayment plan.
He then jumps to the much stronger assertion that: "If medical care
is that which can be purchased by means of medical care insurance,
then its 'price' varies proportionately with the price of such insur-
ance." With these definitions of output and price, Reder suggests that
changes in resource productivity in the production of medical care
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insurance premiums and an index of input prices. If the cost of in-
surance remains constant while input prices rise, productivity is said
to increase; if insurance premiums rise with given input prices, pro-
ductivity is said to fall.
I find the "cost of insurance" approach to price and productivity
measurement unsatisfactory. It fails to distinguish between unit price
and total (expected) expenditure. An individual's total expenditure
on medical care reflects the number of services purchased, the aver-
age "quality" of each service, and the prices of services of different
qualities. If all unit prices remain unchanged between two successive
years, but consumers purchase more services or services of higher qual-
ity, the "cost of insurance" price index will rise and the implied pro-
ductivity change will be negative.
In practice the "cost of insurance" price index is almost certain to
be biased upward. If the calculations are not restricted to "fully com-
prehensive" insurance programs, average premiums will rise through
time in reflection of the trend toward more comprehensive coverage.
But even if attention were restricted to fully comprehensive insur-
ance, I suspect that the number and average quality of services con-
sumed would increase with time in response to technical innovation,
increased availability, and higher aspirations on the part of doctors
and patients. Some of my own research on the operation of the British
National Health Service 1supportsthis view. Although everyone in
Britain is legally covered by a free and comprehensive medical care
system, substantial differences in the utilization of services are asso-
ciated with the availability of facilities, with the social class of pa-
tients, and with the treatment preferences of general practitioners.
The effect of such an upward trend in utilization would be an up-
ward bias in the price index and a downward bias in measured pro-
ductivity.
Reder carefully qualifies his discussion by stating that the "cost of
insurance" method of productivity measurement is only valid if the
"quality" of care is unchanged. Because he defines "quality" of care
very broadly—to mean both the number of services consumed and the
average quality per service—he is guilty of no formal error. But it
1M.S. Feldstein, Economic Analysis for Health Service Efficiency: Econometric
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seems to me that this merely hides the basic difficulty of aggregating
individual health sector outputs under the more familiar heading of
quality measurement.
Reder's second approach to output measurement is to a dis-
aggregated description of the physical health benefits produced in
each year or, if cross-section comparisons are to be 'in each
patient group. The measures of physical health benefits include
not only mortality and morbidity rates but also of pa-
tient satisfaction, the number of undetected illnesses, Although
such an approach appeals to me as one of substantial profuse, it
faces two serious difficulties.
The first of these is estimating the extent to which differences in
medical care are responsible for differences in health varIables, either
over time or between groups. It might at first appear that such esti-
mates could be provided by a set of multiple regressIon equations,
each relating one aspect of the health level (e.g., a particular mortality
rate) to variables which measure the inputs of medical services and
the population characteristics relevant to the dependent variable.
Several researchers have in fact estimated equations of this type. In
practice, high correlation among the explanatory variables generally
makes it impossible to obtain estimates with any precision; the more
scrupulous the researcher is in including potentially relevant explana-
tory variables, the more serious the multicollinearity problem be-
comes. But the least squares regression approach is subject to more
serious criticism on the theoretical level. First,it implies that the
community's health at the present time depends only on the current
levels of medical care inputs and not on the previous use of health
services. A more sophisticated analytic framework, allowing for differ-
ent delayed responses to medical inputs and environmental factors,
would therefore be necessary. Second, the single equation regression
ignores the fact that the levels of medical care inputs are determined
partly in response to the health of the community. Since areas with
a naturally healthier population will tend to use fewer medical serv-
ices, the regression approach will underestimate the benefits of in-
creasing medical care inputs. Third, to calculate the effect of medical
care on any one aspect of community health, it is necessary to hold
constant statistically all of the other outputs of medical care. Failure
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ofmedical inputs. As you can see, estimating the extent to which
differences in medical care inputs are responsible for differences in
health variables poses a number of difficult econometric problems.
But the usefulness of such estimates for general health sector planning
as well as for productivity measurement, makes the solution of these
problems an important research task.
The second difficulty inherent in Reder's "physical benefit" ap-
proach is the problem of aggregating the individual physical benefits
to obtain a composite scalar output variable. Reder suggests that this
be done by defining a set of weights reflecting the marginal rates of
substitution between outputs. This is essentially what is done for con-
sumer goods in general by using relative market prices. But there the
output is carefully defined as an index of market value at constant
prices. But Reder's index seems to me to be intended as a total wel-
fare or satisfaction measure of output rather than a market value Out-
put measure. The use of constant marginal rate of substitution weights
implies that the underlying utility or welfare function is linear. But
the appropriate marginal rate of substitution between, say, morbidity
from disease A and morbidity from disease B might well depend upon
the current levels of both morbidity rates and upon other dimensions
of health as well. If this is so—if the appropriate utility function is
neither linear nor even separable—it would be very difficult to obtain
the information about preferences that is needed to evaluate the
total output of the health. care industry. One possible solution to this
problem is to abandon the attempt to evaluate total output and to
limit analysis to the changes in output. For small changes from a
previous value and for small differences between groups, constant
marginal-rate-of-substitution weights would be suitable as a linear
approximation to the utility function at its current levels of output.
Although the lack of a value for total output would preclude any
estimate of the proportional output change, it would be possible to
compare output changes between successive pairs of years, etc.
The third and final approach to productivity measurement that I
shall consider is Reder's adaptation of Mrs. Scitovsky's study of the
costs of specific illnesses.2 If attention is restricted to an illness for
2A.A. Scitovsky, "Changes in the Costs of Treatment of Selected Illnesses, 1951—
65." American Economic Review, December 1967, pp. 1182—1195.144Production and Productivity in Service Industries
which the effectiveness of treatment has not varied over time, pro.
ductivity change may be defined as the reciprocal of an index of the
value of inputs per case. A productivity index for all the illnesses in
which treatment effectiveness remained unchanged could then be de-
fined by a suitable weighting of these individual productivity meas-
ures. The obvious serious shortcoming of this method is that atten-
tion must be restricted to illnesses in which treatment effectiveness
has not changed.
Let us look at the reasons why the use of this method is likely to
be misleading—both as a measure of what Reder called "productivity
change for'.. .qualityconstant output" and as a basis for judging
how "technologically progressive" the medical care industryis.In
general, changes in the productivity of treating an illness may be
thought of as reflecting two things: changes in the efficiency with
which resources are used with a given technology, and innovations
which change the technology itself. Such innovations may be divided
into product innovations (i.e., those which alter the effectiveness of
treatment) and process innovations (i.e., those which leave the effec-
tiveness of treatment unchanged while reducing cost). In these terms,
the Reder-Scitovsky method (if I may call it that without implying
that it is advocated by either of them) may be described as trying to
estimate the effects of process innovation and increased efficiency of
resource use by restricting attention to those' illnesses in which there
has been no product innovation. The method will only be successful
if the rate of product innovation is independent (across illnesses) of
the rate of process innovation and of the change in the efficiency of
resource use. If, for example, illnesses with positive rates of product
innovation also have higher rates of process innovation, the Reder-
Scitovsky index will be biased downwards as a measure of the entire
industry's "productivity change...forquality constant output."
A bias in the opposite direction is more likely to occur because the
absence of product innovation probably facilitates increasing the ef-
ficiency with which the unchanged product is produced. The sign
of the net bias is nevertheless indeterminate. However, by pursuing
this problem further, we might be able to learn more about both
productivity measurement and the nature of technical progress in the
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Althoughthe Reder-Scitovsky method may provide a useful and
improvable measure of productivity change for "quality constant out-
put," it is wholly inadequate as a basis for judging how "technologi-
cally progressive" the medical care industry is. Product innovation is
probably the most important aspect of its technological progressive-
ness. The ability to achieve high rates of product innovation must
therefore be heavily weighted in any policy assessment of the organi-
zation of health care services.
That concludes my comments on Reder's suggested methods of pro-
ductivity measurement. My own view is that medical care output may
legitimately and usefully be defined in any of four ways: by an index
of the number of services provided, of the number of cases treated,
of the number of successful treatments, or of various measures of the
community's health. Each definition is progressively more difficult to
implement than the preceding one but comes closer to what we want
for welfare-oriented comparisons of output.8
There is also a further dimension of output that should not be
overlooked: uncertainty. Anything that increases the probability that
effective care will be available when requested should be counted as
an improvement in the quality of output. As per capita income in-
creases, there will be a greater willingness to pay for reduced uncer-
tainty. Such reductions will be achieved, at least in part, by increases
in excess capacity. As a result, costs will rise without a concomitant
increase in tangible output. But it would be as wrong to consider
this to be a fall in productivity as it would be to measure the pro-
ductivity of a fire department by the number of fires extinguished
per fireman. A failure to allow for the contribution of excess capacity
to the reduction of uncertainty will bias downward the measured pro-
ductivity change.
Although my remarks have generally been critical,I think that
Reder's contribution is a substantial one. It provides a bold depar-
S dividing line between inputs and outputs is unclear. For me, the distin.
guishing characteristic is the possibility of substitution. Although Reder classifies
a hospital bed-day as an input, I would treat it as a form of output because it
can be produced with different combinations of inputs. I would not deny, of course,
that a bed-day is also an input used in producing the output, "a treated case."
But a treated case is also an input in producing an improvement in the commu-
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ture from the traditional national income accounting methods of
measuring price and productivity change. Medical care is not like
most other goods; Reder has shown us that we must be prepared to
use novel methods to deal with this new problem.
COMMENTS
SOLOMON FABRICANT, New York University
Melvin Reder has put before us some interesting and instructive
points which we all need to keep in mind when we worry about
measurements of the output, price and productivity of the medical-
care industries.
One suggestion that crops up bothers me enough, however, to force
an immediate reaction. This is the suggestion that we bypass a lot of
problems and measure the productivity of the medical-care industries
by the reciprocal of the real cost incurred in maintaining a given state
of the health of the population.
Were "all other things" th.e same or of negligible importance, this
would make good sense. But neither is true. Health is a function not
only of the output of the medical-care industries but also of many
other industries and activities—education in hygiene, refrigeration,
meat inspection, sports, water and sewage systems, etc. Can we really
argue that medical care constitutes the major factor in maintaining
health, and that the other factors are of negligible importance? Or
that they have changed exactly in proportion to the former—measured
in terms of input? There are many reasons to believe the contrary.
The other factors are not unimportant, nor have they grown in exact
proportion to medical-care output as economic development has pro-
ceeded.
For some purposes, perhaps, we are concerned not with the sources
of good health but only with the level and distribution of health.
As economists, however, we do require knowledge of these sources and
their return per dollar of expenditure. Shall municipal or state or
federal authorities—or the individual family—spend more or less on
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midifiers,or the multitude of other things that affect health? To
answer these questions, we must do the best we can to measure and
compare the marginal revenue yielded by the last dollar spent on
each type of expenditure. This requires, among other things, meas-
uring the output of the health service industries in some more specific
and narrower way than by the general level of health. We are back
to the original question.
Since we cannot skirt the difficulties, we must meet them head-on.
I expect that when we do, measuring not only the effect on health
but also the other benefits (or costs) of medical care, we will profit
from many of the points made by Reder. I expect also that we will
find the trend in the output and productivity of the medical-care in-
dustries growing, and the price falling, much more than current
measurements indicate. Finally, I suspect that we will discover enough
variation in the degree to which there is need to correct these meas-
urements in different periods and places, as to make untenable the
assumption that the bias can be neglected.
WERNER Z. HIRSCH, University of California at Los Angeles
In developing a production function for the medical-care industry
it might be useful to separate the independent variables into two
groups. On the one hand, there are the conventional input factors,
such as different types of labor, capital and material. On the other
hand, there are service conditions affecting input requirements which,
in a sense, are input factors with negative effects. Perhaps a more
useful distinction between conventional input factors and servicing
conditions affecting input requirements is that by and large the for-
mer can be influenced, and perhaps even controlled, by the decision
maker, while this is not true about the latter.
In considering service conditions affecting input requirements, we
can point to a variety of physical, human, financial, legal and politi-
cal factors which can make it easier, or more difficult, for medical-care
services to be rendered. Specific variables to be considered are age of
population, nutrition, housing conditions, climate, etc.148Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
REPLY BY REDER
Had I been sufficiently prescient to anticipate the observations of
my critics, this paper would have been somewhat different both in
exposition and in content. I have made some minor changes from
the preliminary version both in response to the remarks of Feldstein
and Kiarman, and to the suggestions of a number of others. However,
I have tried to avoid such alterations as would have the effect of
removing the target of a discussant's shaft.
CONCEPT OF OUTPUT
Pre paid Care
While definitions are arbitrary, their analytical consequences are
not. To define a unit of medical care as that which would be offered
an individual under a nationwide comprehensive prepayment plan
entails that output must vary proportionately with the number of
individuals covered, and that there is no way in which output per
standardized individual can change.' All of what has hitherto been
considered a variation in output quantity per individual—usually an
implicit inference from a variation in one or more input quantities—
must, on this definition, be considered as a variation of output quality.
One of the reasons why Martin Feldstein objects to this proposed
output concept is precisely that it has this consequence. I readily con-
cede the advantage of an output measure that makes it possible to
distinguish between changes in the number of service units consumed
(per individual) per time period and changes in their quality. How-
ever, to define the service units rendered a given standardized indi-
vidual in a way that permits this distinction causes other difficulties
that are at least as serious. For example: (1) to measure output quan-
1"Standardizedindividual" refers to the number of physical persons weighted
by a measure of their expected use of medical services at given prices and income.
Expected use of medical services is conditional upon the age, sex and various other
characteristics of an individual. In principle, standardization is supposed to elimi-
nate the effect of changes in the composition of a population (with respect to age,
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tityby the quantities of any set of inputs, or any function thereof,
is to preclude the possibility of observing any variation in the effi-
ciency with which inputs are used to generate outputs; (2) to use
episodes of illness treated as the unit of output is open to the objec-
tions that Kiarman makes so forcefully, as well as to still others.
Defining output of medical care as the number of standardized
individuals cared for under comprehensive prepaid coverage, presents
many practical problems of implementation, as Feldstein indicates.
Care must be truly comprehensive; patient inconvenience or unavail-
ability of service must be considered either as an unpaid input or a
quality variation. Lagged effects of past treatment must also be allowed
for; a person with a twenty-year history of "good care," will presum-
ably need less treatment than one of the same age and sex who has
systematically "under-doctored." In principle, the appropriate adjust-
ment should be made in the standardization process; in practice,
rough and ready ad hoc adjustments will have to be made. In infer-
ring changes in quality of care from changes in health conditions of
individuals, it is essential also to make adjustments for changes in
environmental factors (e.g., change in air pollution) that affect health.2
Obviously, it is much easier to say "make allowance" for one ex-
traneous influence or another than to do it. In practice, most of the
suggested adjustments and allowances will have to be performed in a
quite crude manner. However, the difficulties arise mainly from the
attempt simultaneously to measure output directly (not accepting one
or more inputs as a surrogate measure) and to estimate the share of
changes in measured productivity attributable to changes in the qual-
ity of product. Similar difficulties will arise whatever the measure of
output chosen, provided that measurements of output change are to
be net of adjustments for quality change. It is not clear that the par-
ticular output measure discussed involves greater difficulties than
alternatives suggested thus far.
2interpret the comments of both Solomon Fabricant and Werner Hirsch to be
essentially to this same point, and I agree with them. Health depends on many
things beside medical care and I share, what I take to be, Fabricant's view that
improvements in these other factors may have been more important in promoting
health than those in medical care. But to analyze the effect of productivity change
in the provision of medical care upon health,itis necessary to adjust for the
effect of these other variables on health. To make such adjustments is not to
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Fee forService
Though critical, Feldstein views the output measure relevant to
fee for service treatment more favorably than does Klarman. Kiarman
properly objects to this measure as ignoring the role of preventive
care. Possibly the objection could be overcome by including in output
a specified standard amount of diagnostic care, the amount varying
with the age and sex of the individual in question.3 Up to the speci-
fied amount, diagnostic care would be counted as output; beyond it,
such care would not be so For specific individuals, such
an assumption might cause substantial error, but such errors should
cancel out for a large group. Nevertheless,I readily concede the
appropriateness of Kiarman's objection.
Feldstein offers two objections: (1) there are serious difficulties in
estimating the effect of current medical care on health. Certainly, I
agree that estimation of changes in the efficiency of medical care
should take into account lagged response to past treatment. Feldstein
is also correct in warning against the dangers of single equation bias.
As I interpret him on this point, what he is arguing is that an ap-
parent increase in inputs required for treating a particular ailment
for a typical member of a given age-sex class may appear to reflect a
decline in productivity, but may be due in fact to an increase in the
normal severity of the ailment because of environmental changes. In
principle, such confusions can be avoided by including one or more
variables reflecting environmental conditions in the regression. In
practice, specifying the appropriate variables is hard, and one can
never be very confident that he has caught all of the effects of en-
vironmental change or of changes in "taste for medical care." How-
ever, the only pertinent advice is "be careful."
(2) Feldstein objectsmy suggested aggregation procedure for
physical benefits because he supposes I am trying to define a welfare
index of some sort. My purpose is quite different: in my opinion,
welfare judgments as to the marginal rate of substitution between,
SThespecified amount would be determined by an expert panel and would rep-
resent a standard for the typical member of an appropriate age-sex-environment
class.
4Thissuggestion involves fudging productivity measurement since it measures
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say,a reduction in the incidence of one ailment vis-à-vis another are
simply statements about the properties of the judge's individual pref-
erence function over the set of possible states of affairs.
It is not necessary that we specify whether or how these individual
preference functions are aggregated to arrive at the requisite trade-off
relations; for the purpose of this paper, the specifications of these
trade-offs are assumed. In practice, the specification might be made
as an aspect of a program specifying "national goals" for research and
delivery of health care;i.e., they might reflect the preferences of a
national health commission. There are a number of other ways by
which. the requisite characteristics might be posited or even inferred
from collective behavior but this is too large a topic to go into here.
In discussing the aforementioned trade-offs (marginal rates of sub-
stitution) I did not mean to suggest that they were constants; only
that they were specified at each state of "national I suspect
that it was my inadvertent use of the term "weights" (for the mar-
ginal rates of substitution) thatmisled Feldstein on this point. Vari-
able "weights" create problems for constructing output and produc-
tivity indexes precisely analogous to those created by varying prices,
i.e., which set of prices should be used as weights. These problems can
be solved as well or as poorly as their more familiar analogues.
I also agree with what I take to be the thrust of Feldstein's corn-
ment upon uncertainty. However, I believe the main force of his
remarks (on this point) bears upon the costs of queueing and of de-
livery delay rather than upon uncertainty per se.5 Feldstein is correct
in arguing that it is desirable to treat variations in reserve capacity
for furnishing medical service as a variation in output quality. How-
ever, it should be noted that his remarks apply to a very large
class of industries, both in the service and nonservice sectors, and
not only to medical care. Conventional output measures fail to allow
for the productive role of reserve capacity because they take no ac-
count of the economic cost of delivery delay, i.e., the costs of queueing
are neglected. Thus the effect of a reduction in expected delivery
5Onevery important reason for building reserve capacity is to hedge against un-
certainty. However indivisibilities may also lead to (voluntary) holdings of reserve
capacity in the absence of uncertainty. Such reserve capacity may well serve to re-
duce average delivery delays even though they are perfectly foreseen.152Productionand Productivity in Service Industries
delay because of an increase in reserve productive capacity may sug-
gest reduced efficiency because it involves increased pecuniary outlay
(which is recorded) while its yield (delivery convenience) goes un-
measured.
Feldstein is again correct in warning us of the dangers of estima-
tion bias inherent in using information which refers only to ailments
where treatment effectiveness has been invariant as indicative of pro-
ductivity change for all ailments. I intended footnote 19 as a warning
to the same effect but apparently its message did not get through.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Klarman's statement that price discrimination is of declining impor-
tance may be misleading. Price discrimination between richer and
poorer patients probably is declining. But price discrimination be-
tween desirable and undesirable patients, whether for personal or
diagnostic reasons, may be on the increase; i.e., use of standard fee
schedules may disguise wide variations in time and attention offered
for a given fee. This is clearly a matter that needs investigation.
CRITERIA FOR JUDGING QUALITY
I fear that Kiarman has detected in me a residue of layman respect
for medical expertise. He may be right in accusing me of being in-
sufficiently critical of the literature on medical audit. In defense, I
plead technical ignorance. Kiarman's long experience in the health
field gives him a justified independence of judgment in these matters
vouchsafed to few economists. It is very desirable that he write a
critique of medical audit procedures for the benefit of us social scien-
tists who are neophytes in the health care field.
However, Kiarman's appeal for "rough and ready, relatively dirty
methods" for evaluating end results of health services disturbs me.
This may be sound procedural advice to epidemiologists with great
experience in the field, but it would be disastrous for economists to
apply such methods on their own. In emphasizing "experiments of
classic design," epidemiologists may be exhibiting too much caution,
but they may also be indicating fear of incorrect specification of their
models. The impatience of men of affairs, combined with our own
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manyembarrassing episodes. We should be wary of foisting on other
disciplines the methodological errors we are outgrowing in our own.
Kiarman's reservations concerning the rate of undetected illness as
an (inverse) quality indicator seem reasonable. However, if all I knew
about two physicians was their "undetected illness rates," I would
choose the one whose rate was lower.